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ABSTRACT—The uniquely American phenomenon of mass incarceration 
plagues the pretrial space. People awaiting trial make up roughly 20% of 
those held in criminal custody in the United States. Largely overlooked by 
bail-reform advocates, pretrial detention in the federal criminal system 
presents a puzzle. The federal system detains defendants at a much higher 
rate than the states—more than 60% of U.S. citizen-defendants were 
detained pending trial by federal courts last year. But federal defendants 
virtually never fail to appear in court, and they are rarely arrested for new 
crimes while on pretrial release. And unlike state court systems, cash bail is 
disfavored in federal courts. Most federal defendants who are released 
pending trial are released on personal recognizance or unsecured bond. 
This Article argues that the federal experience with pretrial detention—
beginning with its historical roots in old English law and ending with the 
enormous and disparate detention rates that I document today—provides 
important lessons for those seeking to reform bail in both federal and state 
law. This Article tackles a critical empirical question: does the modern, 
broadly discretionary, federal detention regime generate race- or gender-
based disparities in pretrial detention? To answer this question, this Article 
leverages an expansive new dataset that covers more than 300,000 federal 
defendants sentenced between fiscal years 2002 and 2016. The results are 
sobering. White defendants are more likely to be released pending trial than 
otherwise similar Black and Hispanic defendants, and female defendants are 
more likely to be released pending trial than otherwise similar male 
defendants. 
More importantly, a disparity analysis that recognizes the intersectional 
relationship between race and gender paints a more complex picture. The 
most extreme racial disparities are among male defendants—where Black 
men are four percentage points and Hispanic men are six percentage points 
more likely to be detained than similarly situated white men. Among female 
defendants, however, racial disparity presents the opposite relationship: 
Black women are more likely to be released pending trial than Hispanic and 
white women. Notably, this disparity pattern for women does not appear in 
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other studies of pretrial detention in state courts, where white women are 
often the most likely race–gender group to be released. Based on this 
empirical evidence, the Article assesses several possible legal changes to 
address disparity, including amending the federal Bail Reform Act to allow 
judges to consider costs in detention decisions, limiting or prohibiting the 
consideration of dangerousness, expanding appellate review, and narrowing 
or eliminating statutory presumptions of detention. The Article ends by 
offering cautionary lessons for states embarking on bail reform. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Pretrial release for criminal defendants, historically in the form of 
“bail,”1 has existed since at least the thirteenth century. The Supreme Court 
explained a half-century ago that “[b]ail, of course, is basic to our system of 
law,”2 and another court described bail as “necessary to an Anglo-American 
regime of ordered liberty.”3 Bail is imperative because, as the Supreme Court 
explained:  
This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unhampered 
preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior 
to conviction. Unless this right to bail before trial is preserved, the presumption 
of innocence, secured only after centuries of struggle, would lose its meaning.4 
Like mass incarceration, mass detention has not always been the 
American norm. Pretrial detention was severely circumscribed in colonial 
America and for centuries afterwards. It was limited to capital offenses and 
the few cases in which a defendant’s appearance for trial could not be 
otherwise secured. However, the era of “tough on crime” policies in the late 
twentieth century brought drastic changes to our centuries-old bail system. 
During this era, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which 
allowed judges to detain federal defendants based on their apparent danger 
to the community.5 By expanding pretrial detention to reach defendants who 
presented apparent danger—not just risk of nonappearance in court—the 
1984 Act broadened judicial discretion to decide whom to release and whom 
to detain. As described in Part I, Congress acknowledged in 1984 that this 
change was “a significant departure” from centuries of practice6 but did not 
appear concerned about the broad grant of discretion for a fundamental 
right—the right to bail. The system established in 1984 has endured 
essentially unchanged to present day, creating the potential for disparate 
treatment between defendants and judges. For example, as this Article 
 
 1 “Bail” is “the pretrial release of a criminal defendant after security has been taken for the defendant’s 
future appearance at trial.” Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Right to Bail: 
Historical Perspectives, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 328, 329 (1982). Modern bail practice “requir[es] a bail bond 
or the deposit of a sum of money subject to forfeiture” if the defendant does not appear in court. Stack v. 
Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1951). 
 2 Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971). 
 3 Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1155 (8th Cir. 1981) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 
150 n.14 (1968)), vacated on other grounds, Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982). 
 4 Stack, 342 U.S. at 4 (citation omitted). 
 5 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150. 
 6 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3 (1983). 
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describes, federal magistrate judges vary widely—even within their 
jurisdictions—in the rates at which they detain defendants pending trial. 
Today, the federal criminal system detains people pending trial at an 
astonishing rate—more than 60% of the roughly 60,000 criminal defendants 
prosecuted for federal non-immigration offenses were detained pretrial in 
2019.7 When defendants prosecuted for immigration offenses are included, 
the federal detention rate rises to 75%.8 In contrast, in 1979, the federal courts 
detained only 17% of all criminal defendants pending trial.9 And the 
detention rate for felony defendants prosecuted in state courts was around 
38% in 2009—the most recent year for which data are available.10 
In the federal criminal system, the loss of liberty associated with pretrial 
detention is especially grave. The average pretrial detention lasts more than 
eight months.11 Because many federal judicial districts are geographically 
large, defendants can be detained far from their families and other 
community supports. Moreover, a growing body of empirical scholarship 
documents pretrial detention’s destructive collateral consequences for 
defendants. Scholars have found that pretrial detention immediately affects 
a defendant’s case, leading to a longer sentence, an increased likelihood of 
pleading guilty, and a reduced probability of receiving a sentencing 
reduction.12 These findings mean that racial disparities observed in later 
 
 7 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS: FEDERAL PRETRIAL SERVICES TABLES tbl.H-
14A (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_h14a_0930.2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HY3Y-7FN7] (showing that roughly 61% of federal defendants were detained pending 
trial in fiscal year 2019).  
 8 Id. at tbl.H-14.  
 9 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT 1 (1985), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prm-foo.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Z72-FQYQ]. Statistics from 1979 
do not report detention rates by U.S. citizenship, so the 17% detention rate likely overstates the detention 
rate for U.S. citizen-defendants.  
 10 BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 - STATISTICAL 
TABLES 15 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LDE-A2Z4]. 
 11 Amaryllis Austin, The Presumption for Detention Statute’s Relationship to Release Rates, 81 FED. 
PROB. J. 52, 53 (2017); Alison Siegler & Erica Zunkel, Rethinking Federal Bail Advocacy to Change the 
Culture of Detention, CHAMPION, July 2020, at 46, 47 n.18 (stating that the average federal pretrial 
detention in 2019 was 253 days).  
 12 See generally Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The Immediate Consequences of Federal Pretrial 
Detention, 22 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 24 (2020) (finding that federal pretrial release reduces sentence 
length, increases the probability of receiving a sentence below the recommended sentencing range, and 
lessens the probability that a defendant will receive a mandatory minimum sentence); Will Dobbie, Jacob 
Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and 
Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 201 (2018) (finding that 
pretrial detention increases probability of conviction, primarily through increase in guilty pleas); Arpit 
Gupta, Christopher Hansman & Ethan Frenchman, The Heavy Costs of High Bail: Evidence from Judge 
Randomization, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 471 (2016) (finding that assignment of money bail increases 
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stages of the criminal process, such as at sentencing, might be explained in 
part by racial disparities in pretrial detention.13 Pretrial detention also has 
long-term effects, increasing the likelihood of recidivism and generating 
worse employment-related outcomes for defendants who are detained 
pending trial.14 
A comprehensive analysis of racial and gender disparities in federal 
pretrial release is essential to informing the ongoing policy debate around 
bail reform. Although federal detention’s reach is wide, it is likely that 
detention is imposed unequally across the population. Using data covering 
more than 300,000 defendants sentenced in eighty of the ninety-four federal 
district courts over fiscal years 2002 through 2016, this Article is the first 
nationwide analysis of race- and gender-based disparity in federal pretrial 
detention.15 The data used in this Article contain detailed information about 
each defendant and their case, including the defendant’s race, ethnicity, 
gender,16 level of formal education, age, past criminal record, and offense 
type.17 
 
likelihood of conviction and increases recidivism); Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended 
Impact of Pretrial Detention on Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & 
ECON. 529 (2017) (finding that pretrial detainment increases probability of conviction and increases 
recidivism); Megan Stevenson, Distortion of Justice: How the Inability to Pay Bail Affects Case 
Outcomes, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511 (2018) (finding that pretrial detention increases likelihood of 
conviction, length of incarceration sentence, and amount of non-bail court fees owed).  
 13 See, e.g., Leslie & Pope, supra note 12, at 531 (estimating that racial disparities in pretrial 
detention explain 40% of the Black–white incarceration gap and 28% percent of the Hispanic–white gap). 
 14 Dobbie, Goldin & Yang, supra note 12, at 201; Gupta, Hansman & Frenchman, supra note 12, at 
471. 
 15 I am aware of only two papers that examine race-based disparities in some capacity in pretrial 
detention in federal courts. The first, published in 1989, uses data on roughly 6,000 male defendants 
sentenced in ten federal district courts. Celesta A. Albonetti, Robert M. Hauser, John Hagan & Ilene H. 
Nagel, Criminal Justice Decision Making as a Stratification Process: The Role of Race and Stratification 
Resources in Pretrial Release, 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 57, 64 (1989). The second, published 
in 2009, uses data on roughly 1,000 drug offenders sentenced in three federal district courts. Cassia 
Spohn, Race, Sex, and Pretrial Detention in Federal Court: Indirect Effects and Cumulative 
Disadvantage, 57 KAN. L. REV. 879, 883 (2009). There is much more work examining race-based 
disparities in pretrial detention in state courts. See, e.g., David Arnold, Will Dobbie & Crystal S. Yang, 
Racial Bias in Bail Decisions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 1885, 1929 (2018) (finding substantial bias against Black 
defendants). 
 16 This paper refers to defendants as having a binary gender—male or female—because this is the 
categorization used in the U.S. Sentencing Commission data, which is described in Section II.A.1. 
 17 As described in Section II.B, the data’s fulsomeness is critical to understanding the relationship 
between race and gender and detention. Having a rich dataset allows me to access roughly the same 
information that the judge had available to them in deciding release. Judges make detention decisions 
quickly with limited information. With so much detailed data about each defendant and case, it is unlikely 
that a judge will have made a detention decision in reliance on information that I, the researcher, do not 
observe. The comprehensive data also allow me to use many controls that may affect detention status 
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The empirical analysis first reveals disconcerting evidence that federal 
defendants experience disparate pretrial detention outcomes based on gender 
and race. In particular, white defendants are significantly more likely to be 
released pending trial than Black and Hispanic18 defendants, and female 
defendants are significantly more likely to be released pending trial than 
male defendants, even after controlling for a rich set of potentially 
confounding variables.19 Race-based favoritism toward white defendants is 
consistent with prior empirical scholarship finding that white defendants 
experience more favorable outcomes than defendants of color throughout the 
criminal process.20 
However, this analysis does not tell the whole story. The portrait is 
complicated when the Article expands beyond focusing on Black–white, 
Hispanic–white, and male–female disparity and instead examines disparity 
based on defendants’ intersectional gender–race groups. This deeper analysis 
illuminates disparities that are obscured in the initial analysis which 
separately considers race and gender. I find that although Black–white and 
Hispanic–white disparity favors white defendants in the full data, this result 
is driven by disparity among male defendants, who constitute around 85% 
of federal defendants.21 For female defendants, a different result emerges: 
Black female defendants are released pending trial more frequently than any 
other race–gender group. This larger release rate persists even after 
controlling for a rich set of control variables in the data. These results beg 
two questions: What explains racial disparity among male defendants, 
 
(such as the severity of the offense charged) so that I can isolate the relationship between race, gender, 
and detention. 
 18 I use the term “Hispanic” rather than “Latinx” because this is the terminology used in the U.S. 
Sentencing Commission data, which is described in Section II.A.1.  
 19 See infra Section II.B. In particular, the empirical analysis controls for defendant and case 
characteristics that are fixed before the case begins (for example, the defendant’s level of formal 
education, or the severity of their criminal record) that could be correlated with both race and detention.  
 20 See, e.g., Kate Antonovics & Brian G. Knight, A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the 
Boston Police Department, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 163, 177 (2009) (traffic stops); Roland G. Fryer Jr., 
An Empirical Analysis of Racial Differences in Police Use of Force, 127 J. POL. ECON. 1210, 1258 (2019) 
(police use of force conditional on a police–civilian interaction); M. Marit Rehavi & Sonja B. Starr, Racial 
Disparity in Federal Criminal Sentences, 122 J. POL. ECON. 1320, 1350 (2014) (charging); Crystal S. 
Yang, Free at Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 
75, 108 (2015) (sentencing); Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The 
Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 72 (2005) (sentencing); David B. 
Mustard, Racial, Ethnic and Gender Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from the U.S. Federal Courts, 
44 J.L. & ECON. 285, 311–12 (2001) (sentencing). 
 21 See infra Table 1. The majority of ethnically Hispanic defendants charged with federal crimes are 
not U.S. citizens, and noncitizen-defendants are almost always detained pretrial. As described in more 
detail in Section II.A, the data used in this Article are restricted to defendants who are U.S. citizens in 
order to isolate disparity based on race and ethnicity separate from alienage. 
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which, as in other criminal contexts, benefits white defendants? And why are 
Black women released at higher rates than Hispanic and white women (and 
all men)? 
The answers, I argue, could lie in the broadly discretionary nature of 
federal pretrial detention. Judges likely behave in two characteristic ways 
when making highly discretionary decisions like detention decisions. First, 
the type of discretionary decision-making that characterizes federal 
detention determinations—made with limited information, a short time 
frame, and little oversight—often leaves decision-makers susceptible to bias. 
I argue that the empirical findings are consistent with race–gender bias that 
is particularized against Black and Hispanic men via stereotyping. Federal 
bail decisions explicitly center on perceptions of dangerousness, which is an 
enduring and harmful stereotype against Black and Hispanic men.22 Second, 
discretionary decision-making with little oversight might lead judges to rule 
with pragmatism. In particular, I find evidence that suggests judges are 
sensitive to the collateral consequences of detention for defendants, 
particularly defendants with dependents. I show that parenthood helps 
explain the racial disparity results for women—who are more likely to be 
sole custodial parents than men.23 I also explore whether racial disparities in 
charging can explain the findings, either through the Bail Reform Act’s 
presumptions of detention or through selection into the sample. Especially 
for female defendants, I cannot rule out the possibility that the racial 
disparity findings are created by earlier racial disparities in charging 
decisions. 
In a study such as this one, which focuses on federal criminal 
defendants, it is important to note that the majority of criminal defendants in 
the United States are prosecuted in state courts and held in state carceral 
facilities.24 The federal criminal system, however, is both an important and 
useful setting to study pretrial detention disparity. For one thing, the federal 
criminal system is vast: the federal incarcerated population is larger than that 
of any state.25 The federal criminal system also detains defendants at an 
 
 22 See infra Section IV.A. 
 23 See infra Section IV.C. 
 24 In 2017—the last year for which data was available—a little more than 1.5 million people were 
under the legal jurisdiction of a state or federal correctional authority. Within this population, 88% of the 
people were under state jurisdiction and 12% were under federal jurisdiction. This figure largely excludes 
people held in local jails. JENNIFER BRONSON & E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS 
IN 2017, at 1, 3 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p17.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3LZ-NZMJ]. 
 25 Id. at 4. At the end of 2017, the federal incarcerated population comprised 183,058 prisoners, while 
the prison populations of the two largest states—California and Texas—were 131,039 prisoners and 
162,523 prisoners, respectively. 
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enormous rate—more than 60% of federal criminal defendants were detained 
pending trial last fiscal year—and this rate has nearly quadrupled in the last 
four decades.26 On any given day, roughly 50,000 people are detained 
pending trial within the federal criminal system.27 
The federal model also provides critical information for those seeking 
to reform bail at the state level. The federal criminal system contains several 
features that many state bail-reform advocates find desirable. Cash bail is 
strongly disfavored in federal courts. It is rare for a federal defendant to be 
held in pretrial detention because of their inability to post bond.28 Also, in 
contrast to widespread bail practice in state courts, federal defendants are 
entitled to many procedural rights at the pretrial detention stage, including a 
right to a detention hearing at which the defendant enjoys rights to be 
represented by counsel, to testify, to present witnesses and evidence, and to 
cross-examine the government’s witnesses.29 Very few states provide such 
procedural protections to defendants at the pretrial detention stage.30 As a 
result, in federal courts, bail determinations are highly individualized, as 
described in more detail in Section I.B.31 
 
 26 See supra notes 7–9 and accompanying text. 
 27 To arrive at this estimate, I note that in fiscal year 2019, 74,533 people were detained pending 
trial. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 7. In that fiscal year, the average detention period was 
253 days. Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 11. This translates to 74,533 • (253/365) ≈ 51,663 federal 
defendants detained on any given day in fiscal year 2019.  
28 See infra notes 78–84 and accompanying text (describing how the federal bail system is designed 
around ensuring court appearance and community safety, not about burdening the defendant with 
financial conditions).  
 29 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2). 
 30 Only eighteen states require detention hearings for at least some defendants. Amber Widgery, 
Pretrial Detention, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-detention.aspx [https://perma.cc/9LXY-
MQ8K]. The states that require detention hearings for at least some defendants are Alaska, Arizona, 
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, 
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. Id. In many instances, detention 
hearings are only a few minutes long (or less) and are often carried out without a lawyer present. See, 
e.g., Maya Dukmasova, Cook County’s Tradition of Using Bail as Punishment May Be Hard to Change, 
CHI. READER (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.chicagoreader.com/Bleader/archives/2017/09/19/cook-
countys-tradition-of-using-bail-as-punishment-may-be-hard-to-change [https://perma.cc/3EJG-GCN7] 
(reporting that the average bond hearing in Cook County, Illinois ranges from thirty-seven seconds to two 
minutes). 
 31 In contrast, many state and local jurisdictions rely on bail schedules to determine pretrial release. 
A bail schedule is a scheme that translates the arrestee’s alleged offense conduct into a specific bail 
amount, typically without regard for the arrested person’s individual characteristics. See Lindsey Carlson, 
Bail Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 26 CRIM. JUST. 12, 13–14 (2011) (noting that in a 
recent poll, more than 60% of counties indicated that their jurisdiction uses a bail schedule); see also 
James A. Allen, “Making Bail”: Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and Defining the Elusive Meaning 
of “Excessive” Bail, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 637, 655–56, 665 (2017) (arguing that judicial overreliance on bail 
schedules leads to thousands in jail due to their inability to pay). 
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What are this Article’s possible implications for states hoping to reform 
bail? The findings presented in this Article suggest that race- and gender-
based disparities can and will persist in a pretrial detention regime that 
largely eschews cash bail and provides many procedural protections. If 
unwarranted disparity is fueled by racial bias, it is likely to endure in a 
pretrial detention regime that does not explicitly link liquid wealth to release. 
Racial disparities might even be exacerbated if a retreat from cash bail leads 
states to adopt preventative detention systems that center bail decisions 
around dangerousness.32 
The findings also inform the current debate surrounding algorithmic 
decision-making in the criminal system. As technology enters the criminal 
space, a fierce debate has emerged about the extent to which judges ought to 
rely on algorithmic prediction tools in deciding pretrial release and in 
sentencing defendants. Some states have turned to such risk-assessment tools 
to replace or reduce reliance on cash bail.33 The extent to which risk-
assessment instruments exacerbate or mitigate racial disparity in pretrial 
detention is hotly contested. Early empirical evidence, however, suggests 
that the adoption of risk-assessment technology in pretrial detention does not 
have much effect on racial disparity in detention.34 One reason, I claim, is 
that in the absence of risk-assessment technology, detention decisions are 
 
 32 See Joe Hernandez, N.J. Officials Finally Release Data on Bail Reform. Their Conclusion? It’s 
Working, WHYY (Apr. 2, 2019), https://whyy.org/articles/n-j-officials-have-finally-released-data-on-
bail-reform-their-conclusion-its-working/ [https://perma.cc/NS7F-UJ6X] (reporting that although New 
Jersey’s elimination of cash bail reduced pretrial detention, it “had little impact on racial disparity”); see 
also Jeremy B. White, California Ended Cash Bail. Why Are So Many Reformers Unhappy About It?, 
POLITICO MAG. (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/08/29/california-
abolish-cash-bail-reformers-unhappy-219618 [https://perma.cc/3MHS-H6EE] (describing how civil-
rights organizations in California went from initially supporting California’s bail reform bill to ultimately 
opposing it because although the bill (now law) eliminates cash bail, it creates a new pretrial detention 
regime that relies on algorithmic risk assessment and preventive detention). California’s bail reform bill 
was rejected by California voters in 2020 and never took effect. Patrick McGreevy, Prop. 25, Which 
Would Have Abolished California’s Cash Bail System, Is Rejected by Voters, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-03/2020-california-election-prop-25-results 
[https://perma.cc/6RNH-VLB3].  
 33 See, e.g., Jason Tashea, Kentucky Tests New Assessment Tool to Determine Whether to Keep 
Defendants Behind Bars, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2015), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/kentucky_tests_new_assessment_tool_to_determine_whe
ther_to_keep_defendants [https://perma.cc/E226-NM27] (“Since July 2013, the commonwealth of 
Kentucky has served as the test case [for risk assessment].”); Bob Egelko, New Snag in Effort to Abolish 
Cash Bail: ‘Risk Assessment Tools’ Called Racially Biased, S.F. CHRON. (Feb. 24, 2020), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/New-snag-in-effort-to-abolish-cash-bail-risk-15081205.php 
[https://perma.cc/63PX-WGXR] (noting that some advocates criticize California’s bail reform bill 
because it requires local courts to use risk assessment).  
34 See, e.g., Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 309 
(2018) (finding that racial disparities remained constant after Kentucky adopted a bail reform law that 
reduced the use of cash bail for many defendants). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1270 
made by individual judges. And as this Article shows, this form of decision-
making also results in racial disparity. Thus, this Article suggests that while 
eliminating cash bail is an extremely important policy goal,35 lawmakers 
ought to consider additional reforms that will more expressly target racial 
disparity in detention. Part V suggests that explicitly considering the costs of 
detention and limiting the consideration of dangerousness could be 
productive on this front. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by tracing the history of 
the law of pretrial detention in England and the United States and then 
describes how pretrial detention currently functions in federal courts. Part II 
describes the Article’s data and introduces the empirical strategy. Many 
additional methodological details are contained in Appendix A. Part III 
presents estimates of gender- and race-based disparities in pretrial detention 
for federal criminal defendants. Part IV explores potential explanations for 
detention disparity, including racial bias, charging disparity, and sensitivity 
to detention’s collateral consequences. Part V concludes by discussing how 
the findings should inform bail reform efforts in federal and state criminal 
systems. 
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND CURRENT LAW OF  
FEDERAL DETENTION 
In every state and federal judicial district in the United States, an 
arrested person is entitled to a determination by a judicial officer of whether 
they should be released or detained pending trial.36 In federal and state 
jurisdictions today, the decisions of whether to release a person and, if so, 
what conditions to impose on that person upon release are typically guided 
by two central goals: first, to ensure that, if released, the person will return 
to court; and second, to ensure that, if released, the person does not present 
a danger to the community. This Part describes—in broad terms—the 
historical context and contemporary practice of how federal courts carry out 
these goals. Section I.A begins by describing the history of federal pretrial 
 
 35 Although outside the scope of this paper, there are many reasons to criticize cash-bail regimes that 
deprive people of liberty on the basis of poverty and disproportionately affect people of color. See, e.g., 
Cherise Fanno Burdeen, The Dangerous Domino Effect of Not Making Bail, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 
2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/04/the-dangerous-domino-effect-of-not-mak 
ing-bail/477906/ [https://perma.cc/6PJN-9D6D]; Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/4GKW-F9HZ]. 
 36 Alexander Bunin, The Constitutional Right to Counsel at Bail Hearings, 31 CRIM. JUST. 23, 23 
(2016).  
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detention in England and the United States. Section I.B then describes 
current law and practice of pretrial detention in federal courts. 
A. The History of Pretrial Detention in England and the United States 
In the United States, pretrial detention is governed by the Eighth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,37 state constitutional law, federal and 
state statutory law,38 and federal, state, and local rules of criminal 
procedure.39 Statutory and constitutional bail law in the United States is 
based on old English law. This Section traces bail practice from its roots in 
thirteenth-century England, through its implementation in the American 
colonies, to present day. This history confirms two important features of bail. 
First, it demonstrates that beginning at least as early as 1275, legislatures 
attempted to constrain discretion in bail-setting to address corruption and 
abuse of the bail system—a persistent concern among lawmakers. Second, it 
shows that for centuries, bail was primarily conceptualized as a means of 
ensuring a defendant’s appearance in court. Outside of capital cases, the idea 
that bail could serve another purpose—protecting the public from 
dangerousness—did not surface until the mid-twentieth century in England 
and the United States. Thus, as described below, the Bail Reform Act of 
1984, which governs federal pretrial detention today, not only dramatically 
expanded federal detention but also upended the policy goals that 
traditionally animated bail. 
Until the thirteenth century, local sheriffs in England dictated whether 
an arrestee would either be detained or released with guarantees that they 
would return for trial.40 The local sheriffs represented the crown’s sovereign 
authority and therefore “could use any standard and weigh any factor” in 
determining whether an arrestee could be released.41 Sheriffs had discretion 
to detain or release people, which inevitably led to abuses. Some sheriffs 
extracted bribes from those arrested for bailable offenses. Some arrested 
innocent people to extort bail payments.42 The poor could remain in prison 
for years.43 As a result, the lack of limits on the sheriffs’ power in deciding 
detention was a major grievance, leading to the Statute of Westminster I, 
 
 37 The Eighth Amendment states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 38 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3150. 
 39 FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(a). 
 40 S. REP. NO. 98-147, at 3 (1983). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Hermine Herta Meyer, Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 60 GEO. L.J. 1139, 1155 (1972). 
 43 Id. 
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which was enacted by the British Parliament in 1275.44 The Statute of 
Westminster I “eliminated the discretion of sheriffs with respect to which 
crimes would be bailable. Under the Statute, the bailable and non-bailable 
offenses were specifically listed.”45 Although “[t]he sheriffs retained the 
authority to decide the amount of bail and to weigh all relevant factors to 
arrive at that amount,”46 the Statute provided sheriffs with definitive 
guidelines for the exercise of their discretion and threatened fines, “loss of 
office,” and even imprisonment for sheriffs who did not follow the Statute.47 
The Statute, however, did not bind justices of the peace or the king, who 
retained complete discretion over bail.48 
Over time, bail powers transferred from sheriffs to justices, and it 
became apparent in England that bail laws failed to provide protection 
against the complete discretion exercised by the justices. Although the 
British Parliament had extended the limitations of the Statute of Westminster 
I to reach the justices,49 if an individual was charged with an offense listed 
as bailable in the Statute, the justice could functionally deny the individual’s 
release by setting exorbitant bail. Thus, as a matter of practice, judicial 
officers retained immense discretion in deciding who would be detained. The 
British Parliament addressed this problem in 1689 in the English Bill of 
Rights. In the preamble, Parliament listed as one of its findings that 
“excessive Baile hath beene required of Persons committed in Criminall 
Cases to elude the Benefitt of the Lawes made for the Liberty of the 
Subjects.”50 The English Bill of Rights thus stated that “excessive Baile 
ought not to be required.”51 
 
 44 The Statute of Westminster provided, in relevant part, “AND Forasmuch as Sheriffs, and other, 
which have taken and kept in prison Persons detected of Felony, and incontinent have let out by Replevin 
such as were not replevisable, and have kept in Prison such as were replevisable, because they would gain 
of the one party, and grieve the other . . . .” Statute of Westminster 1275, 3 Edw. 1 c. 15, reprinted in 
I STATUTES OF THE REALM 30 (emphasis in original).  
 45 S. REP. NO. 98-147, at 3 (1983). The Statute of Westminster listed various offenses as nonbailable, 
including murder, “those which have broken the King’s Prison, Thieves openly defamed and known . . . 
such as be taken for House-burning feloniously done, or for false Money, or for counterfeiting the King’s 
Seal . . . or for Treason touching the King himself.” Among bailable offenses, it listed those “indicted of 
Larceny . . . or for Petty Larceny,” “Receipt of Felons,” and “some other Trespass, for which one ought 
not to lose Life nor Member.” Statute of Westminster 1275, 3 Edw. 1 c. 15, reprinted in I STATUTES OF 
THE REALM, supra note 44, at 30.  
 46 S. REP. NO. 98-147, at 3 (1983).  
 47 Meyer, supra note 42, at 1155–56. 
 48 Id. at 1156. 
 49 Id. (citing 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554)). 
 50 The Bill of Rights, 1 W. & M. c. 2 (1689).  
 51 Id.  
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The English approach to bail—listing by statute bailable and 
nonbailable offenses while prohibiting excessive bail—made its way to the 
American colonies. For example, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 
1641, the state’s legal code, declared, “No mans person shall be restrained 
or imprisoned by any Authority whatsoever, before the law hath sentenced 
him thereto, If he can put in sufficient securitie, bayle or mainprise, for his 
appearance . . . unlesse it be in Crimes Capital . . . .”52 As in Massachusetts, 
it was typical in the American colonies that nonbailable offenses primarily 
consisted of capital offenses and almost all other offenses were bailable. For 
example, in 1682, Pennsylvania provided in its Frame of Government, the 
state’s constitution before American independence, that “all prisoners shall 
be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offences, where the proof 
is evident, or the presumption great.”53 Other states had similar provisions, 
and early Congress took the same approach, enacting in 1787 the Northwest 
Ordinance, which included a bail clause substantially identical to 
Pennsylvania’s.54 
Two years later, the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1789.55 
Following the long trajectory from the Statute of Westminster I to Colonial 
Era laws, the Act provided for bail in all noncapital cases.56 Even in capital 
cases, bail was available at the discretion of the judge.57 At the same time 
that the First Congress passed the Judiciary Act, it also passed the Bill of 
Rights. The Eighth Amendment of the Bill of Rights prohibits excessive bail 
using language that is nearly identical to the language in the 1689 English 
Bill of Rights.58 Together, the Judiciary Act and the Eighth Amendment 
idealized a pretrial detention regime in which the vast majority of criminal 
defendants were eligible for bail, which was required to be set at an amount 
they could afford. 
 Through the 1800s and most of the twentieth century, bail was 
conceptualized as a tool to ensure that defendants returned to court, and 
federal defendants were detained pending trial if they could not afford to post 
 
 52 Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641), reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 
§ 18, at 37 (William H. Whitmore ed., 1889).  
 53  PA. FRAME OF GOV’T of 1682, art. XI, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/pa04.asp 
[https://perma.cc/3BU2-SE7H]. 
 54 Verrilli, supra note 1, at 337–38. 
 55 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
 56 Id. § 33. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required . . . .”), with The Bill of 
Rights, 1 W. & M., c.2 (1689) (“Excessive [b]ail[] ought not to be required . . . .”). 
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bail.59 Until the mid-twentieth century, federal bail practice did not receive 
much attention from the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1951, however, the Court 
began to clarify the limits and possibilities of federal bail practice. That year, 
the Court held in Stack v. Boyle that bail determinations must be reasonable 
and individualized.60 In particular, the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against excessive bail prevented a court from 
setting bail “higher than an amount reasonably calculated to” assure the 
defendant’s appearance in court.61 The Court in Stack also held that bail 
determinations must be personalized, explaining that “the fixing of bail for 
any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the 
purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”62 The Court’s ruling in 
Stack continued to make clear that bail was largely designed to serve one 
purpose: assuring the defendant’s appearance in court.63 
Despite the Court’s insistence in Stack that bail must be affordable, 
financial bond remained widespread for federal criminal defendants in the 
1950s and 1960s.64 In response to concerns about the bail regime’s 
disproportionate impact on the poor, Congress made its first modern effort 
to improve bail with the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (the 1966 Act),65 a central 
purpose of which was to reduce the use of financial bond in federal criminal 
cases.66 Upon signing the law, President Lyndon B. Johnson remarked: 
Th[e bail] system has endured—archaic, unjust, and virtually unexamined—
ever since the Judiciary Act of 1789. Because of the bail system, the scales of 
 
 59 Ex parte Milburn, 34 U.S. 704, 710 (1835) (“A recognizance of bail, in a criminal case, is taken 
to secure the due attendance of the party accused, to answer the indictment, and to submit to a trial, and 
the judgment of the court thereon.” (emphasis added)). 
 60 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951). 
 61 Id. In Stack, the defendants—twelve members of the Communist Party—were arrested and 
charged with violating the federal Smith Act. Initially, bail was set at different amounts for each 
defendant, ranging from $2,500 to $100,000. Upon the government’s motion to increase bail for some of 
the defendants, the court set bail at a uniform $50,000 for each defendant. The only evidence the 
government offered to support its motion was evidence that four of the defendants had previously 
forfeited bail in another case. Id. at 3.  
 62 Id. at 5 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c)) (emphasis added).  
 63 Others have connected the Eighth Amendment protection against excessive bail to the presumption 
of innocence, which is generally recognized as part of the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7 
(2011) (citing Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148, 1156 (1981)). The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, 
that the presumption of innocence only operates to create a burden of proof for the government at criminal 
trials. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). 
 64 Warren L. Miller, The Bail Reform Act of 1966: Need for Reform in 1969, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 
24, 25 (1969). 
 65 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214. 
 66 Miller, supra note 64, at 30.  
115:1261 (2021) Discretion and Disparity in Federal Detention 
1275 
justice have been weighted for almost two centuries not with fact, nor law, nor 
mercy. They have been weighted with money. . . . The principal purpose of bail 
is to ensure that an accused person will return for trial, if he is released after 
arrest. How is that purpose met under the present system? The defendant with 
means can afford to pay bail. He can afford to buy his freedom. But the poorer 
defendant cannot pay the price. He languishes in jail weeks, months, and 
perhaps even years before trial. He does not stay in jail because he is guilty. He 
does not stay in jail because any sentence has been passed. He does not stay in 
jail because he is any more likely to flee before trial. He stays in jail for one 
reason only—he stays in jail because he is poor.67 
The 1966 Act sought to correct these injustices by requiring 
individualized assessments for bail determinations. The Act provided: 
Any person charged with [a noncapital] offense . . . shall, at his appearance 
before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial on his personal 
recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an 
amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines, in the 
exercise of his discretion, that such release will not reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required.68 
Critically, the 1966 Act did not authorize judges to detain noncapital 
arrestees on the ground that they were dangerous. The only permissible 
reason for pretrial detention (outside capital cases) was to ensure the 
defendant’s appearance in court.69 
Nearly twenty years after its passage, Congress significantly amended 
the 1966 Act with the Bail Reform Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act).70 The 1984 
Act—the governing law today—added language allowing courts to impose 
conditions of release or order a defendant be detained pending trial in order 
to ensure the safety of the community.71 The Senate Judiciary Committee, in 
support of its proposal for reforming the 1966 Act, concluded “that federal 
bail laws must address the alarming problem of crimes committed by persons 
 
 67 Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, AM. PRESIDENCY 
PROJECT (June 22, 1966), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/238665 [perma.cc/5YLJ-CMCV]. 
 68 Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214.  
 69 The 1966 Act applied to federal courts. After the 1966 Act passed, some states implemented 
similar statutes while other states passed statutes that also included preventive detention. Preventive 
Detention, PRETRIAL JUST. CTR. FOR CTS. (2017), 
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/1594/preventive-detention-brief-final.ashx.pdf 
[perma.cc/DKR7-GLXM] (reporting that twenty-two states and Washington, D.C. authorize preventive 
detention for certain serious charges). 
 70 18 U.S.C. § 3142. 
 71 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1276 
on release.”72 The Committee also gave ample weight to findings that judges 
employed “a widespread practice” of detaining dangerous defendants by 
setting excessive bail to ensure detention.73 This practice was recognized as 
a sub rosa form of pretrial detention.74 A later committee report concluded it 
was “intolerable that the law denies judges the tools to make honest and 
appropriate decisions regarding the release of such [dangerous] 
defendants.”75 Congress linked this problem to a decline in judicial 
discretion. It found that “[t]he overall effect of the erosion of both the 
classical surety system and the ineligibility for bail based on grave offenses 
[due to narrowing of offenses that qualified as capital crimes] is a striking 
reduction in the discretion of the courts” to detain likely dangerous 
defendants.76 
Congress thus adopted changes in 1984 that for the first time in the 
nation’s history gave federal judges the discretion to detain defendants 
pretrial based on a perceived risk of dangerousness. The Committee 
acknowledged that “adoption of these changes marks a significant departure 
from the basic philosophy of the Bail Reform Act, which is that the sole 
purpose of bail laws must be to assure the appearance of the defendant at 
judicial proceedings.”77 Congress placed few limitations on this new judicial 
authority to “deal with . . . a small but identifiable group of particularly 
dangerous defendants”—except to preclude the prior practice of sub rosa use 
of money bond to detain dangerous defendants.78 Congress did so by 
inserting a statutory provision prohibiting judges from imposing a financial 
condition that results in pretrial detention.79 The Committee believed the 
proper course was to “refrain[] from specifying what kinds of information 
are a sufficient basis for the denial of release, and has chosen to leave the 
resolution of this question to the sound judgment of the courts acting on a 
case-by-case basis.”80 
The 1984 Act imposed no limitations on what kinds of evidence the 
court could consider (or whether it must consider any evidence at all rather 
 
 72 S. REP. NO. 98-147, at 1–2 (1983).  
 73 Id. at 20 (citing ATTORNEY GENERAL’S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT CRIME: FINAL REPORT 51 
(1981)). 
 74 Id.; see also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 5–11 (1984) (discussing the judicial practice of setting 
excessive bail to detain defendants). 
 75 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 5. 
 76 S. REP. NO. 98-147, at 20. 
 77 Id. at 2. 
 78 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6. 
 79 Id. at 16. 
 80 Id. at 19. 
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than proceeding by evidentiary proffer), what factors it should weigh, how 
to weigh these factors, what it meant to present a “risk” of dangerousness, 
how much of a risk was sufficient to detain a defendant, how to balance this 
risk with the deprivation of liberty, what it meant to be “dangerous,” and so 
on. Instead, it placed a limitation on the types of cases in which prosecutors 
could move for detention.81 This lack of restraint was surprising because the 
1984 Act was passed within the same comprehensive crime control act as the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which brought one of the most drastic 
changes to the nation’s federal sentencing laws by sharply curtailing judicial 
discretion in sentencing.82 In other words, while Congress was dramatically 
expanding judicial discretion at the start of a criminal case, it was sharply 
curtailing it at its end. Poignantly, in the same report in which the Committee 
extolled the virtues of “the sound judgment of the courts acting on a case-
by-case basis” in pretrial decisions, it criticized, with respect to sentencing, 
that “[e]ach judge is left to formulate his own ideas about the factors to be 
considered in imposing sentence and the effect that each factor should have 
on the sentence imposed. The result is unwarranted disparities among 
sentences imposed by different judges.”83 In fact, some of the impetus for 
severely circumscribing judicial discretion in federal sentencing was the 
belief that expansive judicial discretion had led to racial disparities. Such 
concerns apparently did not spread into the pretrial reform process. Thus, 
since the 1984 Act, federal pretrial detention is designed to serve two goals: 
(1) to assure the defendant’s appearance in court, and (2) to protect the safety 
of any other person and the community.84 The following Section builds on 
this historical understanding by describing how pretrial detention works in 
federal courts today. 
 
 81 Id. at 20. 
 82 Such curtailment was later held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 
543 U.S. 220, 267 (2005). 
 83 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 75. 
 84 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). The 1984 Act’s preventive detention provision was challenged and 
subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). In 
Salerno, the Supreme Court held that the preventive-detention provision of the 1984 Act violated neither 
the Eighth Amendment nor the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. After the passage of the 
1984 Act, many states enacted laws that were modeled after the 1984 Act. Lindsey Carlson, Bail 
Schedules: A Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 26 CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2011).  
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B. Present-Day Pretrial Detention, in Law and Practice 
1. Conditions of Release and Preventative Detention 
The 1984 Act governs federal pretrial detention today. Most federal 
pretrial detention decisions are made by federal magistrate judges,85 based 
on information provided by prosecutors, defense counsel, and pretrial-
services officers.86 Despite allowing the court to detain defendants in some 
circumstances pending trial, the language of the 1984 Act expresses a clear 
preference for pretrial release. For most defendants, the 1984 Act directs the 
presiding judicial officer to release the defendant under the least restrictive 
conditions reasonably necessary to assure the appearance of the defendant in 
court and the safety of any other person and the community.87 Moreover, the 
Act enumerates seven factors that will support detention. For example, the 
government may only move for detention based on dangerousness in cases 
involving certain identified offenses.88 The Act makes clear that if a 
defendant does not fall into one of these seven categories, the defendant must 
be released.89 
The Act also expressly prohibits judges from imposing financial 
conditions that a defendant cannot afford.90 Instead, federal magistrate judges 
often impose conditions of release that they believe will guarantee the 
defendant’s return to court and the safety of the community.91 Conditions can 
include travel restrictions (including up to home detention), substance-abuse 
treatment requirements, weapons restrictions, promises to remain employed 
 
 85 In prior work, I find that for more than 90% of federal criminal defendants, the first judge assigned 
to their case is a federal magistrate judge. Didwania, supra note 12, at 35.  
 86 Pretrial-services officers are employees of the court who—among other duties—make release and 
detention recommendations. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1).  
 87 Id. § 3142(b)–(c). 
 88 Id. § 3142(f)(1)(A)–(E). 
 89 The categories are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). See United States v. Dillard, 214 F.3d 88, 96 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (suggesting that if a defendant does not fall into one of the specific categories that permit 
detention, she must be released “no matter how obviously dangerous or how bent on committing an act 
of violence . . . [she] may be”). But see The Administration of Bail by State and Federal Courts: A Call 
for Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 6 (2019) (written statement of Alison Siegler, Clinical Professor of Law 
and Director of the Federal Criminal Justice Clinic, University of Chicago Law School) [hereinafter 
Administration of Bail] (discussing a court-watching program, which found that in 95% of cases, the 
government did not cite any § 3142(f) factor to support detention); Siegler & Zunkel, supra note 11, at 
8–10 (same). 
 90 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2). 
 91 THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRETRIAL RELEASE AND 
MISCONDUCT IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2008–2010, at 7 (2012), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BY8-T6CB] (stating that 79% of 
released federal defendants were released with conditions). 
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or seek employment, and electronic monitoring.92 If no conditions exist that 
can reasonably assure the defendant’s appearance and the safety of any other 
person and the community, then pretrial detention is appropriate under the 
Act.93 
Detention decisions thus involve considerable judicial discretion. By its 
terms, the 1984 Act instructs judges to evaluate two malleable factors: the 
defendant’s perceived dangerousness and risk of flight. This statutory 
malleability coupled with the fact that detention decisions are rarely 
reviewed helps create a federal system in which federal magistrate judges 
vary widely in their propensities to release defendants pending trial. In recent 
work on the consequences of federal pretrial detention, I find that most 
lenient federal magistrate judge released 70% of defendants while the least 
lenient magistrate judge released just 4% of defendants.94 
Statistics on federal pretrial detention suggest that modern pretrial 
detention practice complies with the 1984 Act’s requirement that pretrial 
release not be expressly connected to a defendant’s ability to pay. In contrast 
to state court systems, where cash bail is widely used, the two most common 
types of pretrial release in the federal system are release on unsecured bond 
and release on personal recognizance.95 Release on unsecured bond means a 
defendant promises to pay a specified sum if they break the conditions of 
release, but they do not have to pay any money upfront. Release on personal 
recognizance means a defendant will not pay any financial penalty if they do 
not return to court. A small share of federal defendants use a bail bondsman,96 
and it is rare for a federal defendant to be held in detention because they are 
unable to post bond. According to the most recent data (from 2008 to 2010), 
only 9% of federal defendants who were detained pretrial were subject to 
financial bond.97 And, despite its minimal reliance on financial conditions, 
only 1% of released defendants in federal court failed to make court 
appearances, and 4% were rearrested for new offenses while released.98 
 
 92 Id. at 8 tbl.6.  
 93 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). 
 94 Didwania, supra note 12, at 30.  
 95 COHEN, supra note 91, at 5 tbl.3 (stating that among released defendants in federal criminal cases 
in fiscal years 2008–2010, 39% were released with unsecured bond, 32% were released on recognizance, 
and 27% were required to pay a cash bond of some form). Release on unsecured bond means a defendant 
promises to pay a certain amount of money if he breaks the conditions of his bond but does not have to 
pay any money upfront. Release on personal recognizance means a defendant is permitted to return to his 
community without any financial penalty if he does not return to court. Id. at 18.  
 96 Id. at 5. 
 97 Id. at 6 tbl.4. 
 98 Id. at 13 tbl.11.  
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1280 
Of course, federal arrestees with few resources undoubtedly face more 
challenges than wealthier defendants throughout the criminal process, 
including at the pretrial detention stage. Section III.B.2 shows that federal 
defendants with more financial means are less likely to be detained pending 
trial than defendants whose fines are waived by the court. And some 
magistrate judges do routinely require defendants to obtain a bail bond or 
post real property as security in exchange for release, conditions that 
disproportionately impact indigent defendants.99 But the 1966 and 1984 Acts 
undoubtedly ushered in a new era of federal pretrial detention, eschewing 
reliance on cash bail and shifting the focus to individualized pretrial 
detention determinations and conditions. 
2. Presumptions of Detention Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) 
Under the 1984 Act, certain offenses carry a rebuttable presumption of 
detention. The Act includes two presumptions. Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(e)(3), sometimes called the “Drug and Firearm Offender 
Presumption,” detention is presumed to be warranted for any defendant 
charged with one of several enumerated offenses (largely drug and firearm 
offenses), regardless of the defendant’s criminal history. Under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(e)(2), sometimes called the “Previous Violator Presumption,” 
detention is presumed for defendants with certain prior convictions who are 
charged with one of several enumerated offenses (also largely drug and 
firearm offenses). 
Most defendants who are subject to a presumption of detention are 
subject to the Drug and Firearm Offender Presumption, and there is also 
significant overlap between the two presumptions.100 Roughly 40% to 45% 
of federal defendants are subject to the Drug and Firearm Offender 
Presumption.101 The Drug and Firearm Presumption has been criticized on 
the ground that it reaches too widely, applying a presumption of detention to 
many defendants (especially drug offenders) who pose a low risk of failing 
to appear, being rearrested, or violating a condition that would result in the 
revocation of pretrial release.102 For this reason, two years ago, the Judicial 
Conference of the United States’ Committee on Criminal Law recommended 
 
 99 Administration of Bail, supra note 89, at 10. The Bail Reform Act allows these practices, although 
no nationwide data indicate how frequently they are used. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xii). 
 100 Austin, supra note 11, at 54.  
 101 Id. at 55 fig.1. In the data used in this paper, I also estimate that roughly 45% of defendants face 
this presumption. See infra Appendix A for details on how this variable was coded. 
 102 Austin, supra note 11, at 60; see also Administration of Bail, supra note 89, at 13–15 (arguing 
that the presumptions of detention should be modified because they lead to unnecessary detention for 
many defendants who pose very low risk of danger to the community or failure to appear in court).  
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amending the 1984 Act to rein in the presumption, finding “the § 3142(e) 
presumption [is] unnecessarily increasing detention rates of low-risk 
defendants, particularly in drug trafficking cases.”103 Section IV.C.1 
examines the relationship between the presumptions and detention disparity. 
3. Detention Hearings Under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) 
Roughly two-thirds of released defendants are released at their initial 
appearance in court, and the other one-third of released defendants are 
initially detained and later released after a detention hearing.104 As noted 
above, Congress limited “the requisite circumstances for invoking a 
detention hearing.”105 For example, as described above, the government can 
only move for detention based on dangerousness if the case falls into one of 
seven categories listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1).106 This limitation was “in 
effect . . . to limit the types of cases in which detention may be ordered prior 
to trial.”107  
The remaining released defendants are initially detained and later 
released after a detention hearing. To keep a defendant in pretrial detention, 
the court must conduct a detention hearing within five days of the 
defendant’s initial appearance.108 A defendant also may consent to pretrial 
detention. For example, noncitizen-defendants sometimes consent to pretrial 
detention because pretrial release puts them at risk of being transferred to 
immigration custody.109 Defendants who are not U.S. citizens are rarely 
released because they frequently have ties to another country that judges 
view as creating a risk of flight.110 
At a detention hearing, the government must prove that no condition of 
release would reasonably ensure that the defendant will appear for trial and 
not pose a risk to the community.111 At the hearing, the defendant has the 
 
 103 JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 10–11 (2017), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/17-sep_final_0.pdf. 
[https://perma.cc/H8YP-34QE].  
 104 COHEN, supra note 91, at 3 tbl.1. 
 105 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 20 (1983). 
 106 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1). 
 107 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 20. 
 108 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). 
 109 LENA GRABER & AMY SCHNITZER, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF THE NAT’L LAWS. GUILD, THE 
BAIL REFORM ACT AND RELEASE FROM CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION CUSTODY FOR FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 1 (2013), https://nationalimmigrationproject.org/PDFs/practitioners/practice_a
dvisories/crim/2013_Jun_federal-bail.pdf [https://perma.cc/QEA5-Z5AE].  
 110 In the U.S. Sentencing Commission data, around 8% of federal defendants who are not U.S. 
citizens were released pending trial, compared to around 40% of U.S. citizen-defendants. 
 111 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). 
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right to be represented by a lawyer, to testify, to present witnesses and 
evidence, and to cross-examine government witnesses.112 In deciding 
whether to release the defendant, the judge is directed to consider several 
factors, including: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the weight of 
the evidence; the history and characteristics of the defendant, including their 
character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial 
resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past 
conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and 
record concerning appearance at court proceedings; whether, at the time of 
the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, parole, or other 
release for a criminal offense; and the nature and seriousness of the danger 
to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s 
release.113 Detention and release decisions made by magistrate judges can be 
appealed to the federal district court, which will review the detention 
decision de novo.114  
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
This Part describes the data and empirical methodology used to estimate 
race- and gender-based disparities in federal pretrial detention. Section II.A 
briefly describes the data. Section II.B discusses the empirical approach in 
broad terms, examining its advantages and its limitations. Many additional 
methodological details are contained in Appendix A. 
A. The Data 
This Article uses a rich, new dataset of federal criminal defendants 
sentenced between fiscal years 2002 and 2016 in eighty of the ninety-four 
federal district courts. I constructed the dataset by merging data from two 
sources: the United States Sentencing Commission’s annual data files (the 
Commission Data) and Executive Office of United States Attorneys 
(EOUSA) data that are compiled from the Legal Information Office Network 
 
 112 Id. § 3142(f). 
 113 Id. § 3142(g). 
 114 Id. § 3145(a)–(b). Every federal circuit court has confirmed that a federal district court’s review 
of a magistrate judge’s detention decision is de novo. United States v. Tortora, 922 F.2d 880, 883 n.4 (1st 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Delker, 757 F.2d 1390, 
1394 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 331 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Fortna, 
769 F.2d 243, 249 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985); United 
States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 761 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1481 (8th Cir. 
1985); United States v. Koenig, 912 F.2d 1190, 1191 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cisneros, 328 F.3d 
610, 616 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1481 (11th Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  
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System (the LIONS Data). This Section describes the data from each of these 
two sources and provides a brief explanation of how the two datasets were 
merged. Additional details about data construction are provided in Appendix 
A.115 
1. Commission Data 
The United States Sentencing Commission annually publishes 
individual data files that include detailed information about federal 
defendants convicted of felonies and Class A misdemeanors. The 
Commission dataset includes thousands of variables about defendants and 
their cases. For example, the Commission dataset reports a defendant’s racial 
or ethnic group, gender, age, level of formal education, and criminal history 
information. The Commission dataset also includes case information, 
including the type of offense, the precise statute or statutes of conviction, 
whether a weapon was charged, and the types and quantities of drug 
attributed to the defendant in the offense (if any). The Commission dataset 
also reports whether a defendant’s fines were waived by the court, which is 
an important proxy for the defendant’s income level, especially given the 
interconnected relationship between race, poverty, and pretrial detention. 
The Commission dataset also includes the month, fiscal year, and federal 
district court in which the defendant was sentenced. To the extent that 
detention rates vary over time and space, these variables allow me to control 
for this variation. Finally, the Commission dataset includes a variable that 
indicates whether the defendant was in custody or released prior to 
sentencing. I use this variable to capture the defendant’s pretrial release 
status.116 
2. LIONS Data 
Like the Commission dataset, the LIONS dataset reports information 
about individual federal criminal cases. The LIONS dataset includes 
comprehensive information about each case but minimal information about 
defendants’ personal characteristics. For purposes of this project, the LIONS 
dataset contains two important features. First, compared to the Commission 
 
 115 The data used in this paper were used in earlier work that estimates the effects of pretrial detention 
on case outcomes for federal criminal defendants, and the matching process is also thoroughly described 
in the text and appendix of that work. See Didwania, supra note 12, at 59–62.  
 116 A defendant’s presentence status is not a perfect measure of their pretrial status because a 
defendant’s release status can change between the time they are arrested and the time they are ultimately 
sentenced. For example, defendants who have a detention hearing will be detained until the hearing but 
might be released afterwards. Defendants who are released pending trial can have their pretrial release 
revoked while on pretrial release. Importantly, too, once a defendant pleads guilty, the Bail Reform Act 
creates a presumption of detention, which can lead the defendant to be detained for the period between 
pleading guilty and sentencing. 
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dataset, the LIONS dataset provides more precise geographic information 
about where the defendant lives and where their case was prosecuted, 
including the precise courthouse in which the case was prosecuted, rather 
than just the federal district court. This specificity allows the analysis to 
account for this relevant unit of geography, since cases are almost always 
prosecuted in the courthouse local to the offense. A second important feature 
of the LIONS dataset is that it contains offense information that is much 
more narrowly defined than the offense variables included in the 
Commission dataset. In particular, the LIONS dataset includes variables that 
indicate 105 different types of offenses, which allows me to control for fine-
grained offense types in the robustness checks in Appendix B. 
3. Merged Data 
To merge the two datasets, I match defendants between the Commission 
data and the LIONS datasets using an iterative matching process described 
in Appendix A. The merged dataset contains defendants sentenced in fiscal 
years 2002 through 2016. Before matching defendants between the two data 
sources, I removed defendants who are not U.S. citizens and defendants 
prosecuted in federal districts that border Mexico.117 Noncitizen-defendants 
are removed from the data because they are unlikely to be released pending 
trial due to their citizenship status.118 Defendants in districts that border 
Mexico are excluded because these federal districts face uniquely intense 
caseload pressures that could influence pretrial detention decisions for U.S. 
citizen-defendants. For example, if pretrial detention facilities are pressed 
for space, U.S. citizen-defendants may be more likely to be released pending 
trial.119 In total, 396,061 out of the 521,023 U.S. citizen-defendants in 
nonborder districts match between the two datasets—a match rate of 76%. 
After matching, I restrict the data to courthouses that include at least twenty 
observations.120 The final dataset used in this analysis contains 337,916 
observations. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the data. Although the data are 
representative of the federal defendant population,121 they do not represent 
 
 117 There are five border districts: the District of Arizona, the District of New Mexico, the Southern 
District of California, the Southern District of Texas, and the Western District of Texas.  
 118 In the Commission data, roughly 40% of U.S. citizen-defendants were released pending trial, 
while only 6% of noncitizen-defendants were released. 
 119 Despite comprising just five of the ninety-three federal district courts, the border districts listed 
in supra note 117 account for 34% of defendants in the Commission data.  
 120 This restriction removes less than 1% of observations. 
 121 Readers who wish to evaluate how the data used in this sample compare to the full universe of 
Commission defendants may refer to infra Table A1, which compares summary statistics of the data used 
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the greater U.S. population. Notably, the federal defendant population 
includes larger proportions of men and people of color than the overall U.S. 
population. For example, in the data, 84% of defendants are male, whereas 
around half of the U.S. population is male. Among defendants in the data, 
40% are Black, 11% are of Hispanic ethnicity, 45% are white, and 5% are 
another race.122 In contrast, the U.S. population in 2010—roughly the 
midpoint of the time period covered by the data—was 12% Black, 15% 
Hispanic ethnicity, 64% white, and 9% another race.123 
In the data, 60% of defendants were held in detention, while 30% were 
released with conditions and 10% were released on recognizance. These 
pretrial detention rates are consistent with other reported statistics of federal 
pretrial detention.124  
  
 
in this Article to the relevant universe of all federal defendants contained in the Commission data. Overall, 
Table A1 suggests that the matching process generated a dataset that very closely represents the full set 
of citizen-defendants in nonborder districts. 
 122 In the Commission dataset, defendants coded as “another race or ethnicity” include defendants 
who are American Indian/Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, multiracial, or another race. U.S. 
SENT’G COMM’N, VARIABLE CODEBOOK FOR INDIVIDUAL OFFENDERS 39 (2015), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/datafiles/Individual_Codebook 
_FY99_FY14.pdf  [https://perma.cc/4T6G-SPAH].   
 123 These are the author’s own calculations from the U.S. Census Bureau data in infra Table 1. 
Summary of Modified Race and Census 2010 Race Distributions for the United States (US-MR2010-01), 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2010), https://www.census.gov/data/datasets/2010/demo/popest/modified-race-
data-2010.html [https://perma.cc/5NSS-X2MY]. Members of the U.S. population who reported being 
more than one race were coded as another race. Black and white populations exclude people of Hispanic 
ethnicity. 
 124 For example, between 2008 and 2010, 79% of released defendants were released with conditions, 
according to the Bureau of Justice Statistics. COHEN, supra note 91, at 1. In the data, 75% percent of 
released defendants were released with conditions. On the other hand, the detention rates reported by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics are lower than those in the data used in this paper. According to the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, between 2008 and 2010, around 45% of U.S. citizen-defendants were detained. Id. 
at 10. In the data, the detention rate is around 60%. This discrepancy could be because the Bureau of 
Justice Statistics counts defendants as “released” if they are released for some of the pretrial period and 
later detained. In contrast, the Commission data used in this paper counts defendants as “detained” if they 
are detained prior to sentencing. On the other hand, the 60% detention rate in the data is slightly lower 
than the analogous “detained and never released” rate of 66% in 2009, as reported by the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS: FEDERAL PRETRIAL 
SERVICES TABLES tbl.H-14A (2009), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/statistics_import_dir/ 
H14Sep09.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ET7-8B4U]. 
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TABLE 1: VARIABLE MEANS IN THE SAMPLE 
  Mean Observations 
Defendant Characteristics 
Male 0.84 337,916 
Black 0.40 337,916 
Hispanic 0.11 337,916 
Other Race/Ethnicity 0.05 337,916 
White 0.45 337,916 
Age (years) 36.9 337,916 
Less than High School 0.29 337,916 
HS Only 0.40 337,916 
Some College 0.23 337,916 
College Graduate 0.08 337,916 




   
Case Characteristics 
Drugs Involved 0.42 337,916 
Base Offense Level  
(0–47) 
19.3 335,406 
Weapon 0.13 337,916 
Year Case Began 
(median) 
2007 337,916 
Fiscal Year Sentenced 
(median) 
2009 337,916 
   
Pretrial Detention Variables 
Detention 0.60 337,916 




Note. All variables are indicator variables (0/1) 
except where units are noted.  
 
B. The Empirical Method 
The empirical analysis uses a linear probability model. This empirical 
method estimates linear regressions where the outcome variable can only 
take on two values (here, detained or released). This method thus captures 
the relationship between the binary outcome variable (detention status) and 
the many variables that are thought to be related to the outcome. In this 
Article, the key variables of interest are the defendant’s race, gender, or race–
gender group. Using regression analysis to estimate the extent to which race 
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and gender contribute to an outcome (here, whether a person is detained) is 
a traditional way that empirical scholars measure disparity.125 
A common concern with using regression analysis to quantify disparity 
is the possibility of under-controlling for relevant factors. In estimating the 
relationship between race or gender and detention status, there might be 
unobserved factors that are correlated with race or gender that affect the 
probability of being detained pretrial. For example, on average, male 
offenders commit more serious offenses than female offenders.126 Because 
the defendant’s offense conduct is a factor that (perhaps rightfully) 
influences the pretrial detention decision, one would expect male offenders 
to be detained at higher rates than female offenders, and one would likely 
not consider the male–female detention difference alone to be evidence of 
unwarranted gender disparity in detention. Therefore, a regression of 
detention on gender that does not control for the defendant’s offense conduct 
will likely overstate unwarranted gender differences in pretrial detention 
because differential outcomes will be improperly attributed to gender, rather 
than to offense conduct. For this reason, the regressions in this Article 
include many control variables, including a control for offense severity. 
Under-controlling, however, is not a substantial concern here for 
several reasons. First, as noted above, the dataset is rich with potential 
control variables. The regression analysis controls for many variables that 
could be correlated with race, gender, and detention, including age, 
education, financial status, geography, offense conduct, criminal history, and 
time. Second, the set of control variables used here widely covers the 
information a judge would have available when making a decision about 
pretrial release, which helps to address the problem that a judge might rely 
on information for which an empirical analysis cannot account. As described 
in Section I.B.3, pretrial detention decisions are made at earlier stages in a 
federal criminal case. While the magistrate judge will typically know some 
basic facts about the defendant and the case, they will not be operating with 
the type of detailed information that will typically be available at sentencing. 
As a result, it is unlikely that the analysis here will omit an important variable 
 
 125 There are many examples using linear models in the sentencing context. See, e.g., Yang, supra 
note 20, at 86; Schanzenbach, supra note 20, at 64; Mustard, supra note 20, at 297. Linear probability 
models work well because they produce estimates that are intuitive for readers to interpret as percentage 
changes. The results presented in this Article are robust to using logistic regression (results on file with 
journal).  
 126 For example, in the data used in this paper, the average base offense level (a measure of offense 
severity) is 20.1 points for male defendants and 15.1 points for female defendants (on a scale of 1–43). 
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from the controls that is observed by the judge but not by the researcher—
the archetypal under-controlling concern. 
Many thoughtful researchers using regression analysis to estimate 
unwarranted disparity in the criminal system deeply engage with the under-
controlling problem. The usual strategy that scholars deploy to address the 
problem is to include many control variables in their regression analysis.127 
Ideal control variables include defendant characteristics that are fixed before 
the case, such as the defendant’s level of education, criminal history score, 
and age. However, scholars sometimes include additional control variables 
that are not fixed at the time of the case—such as the defendant’s final 
offense level or presumptive sentence—in an effort to address the under-
controlling problem.128 
This approach can lead to a second potential concern: overcontrolling. 
If a regression controls for characteristics of a case that could themselves be 
the product of discrimination, the analysis will mismeasure disparity.129 To 
borrow an example from Professors Sonja Starr and M. Marit Rehavi, 
suppose prosecutors charge Black defendants more harshly than white 
defendants for the same criminal conduct.130 This unwarranted disparity at 
charging means that Black defendants will enter the sentencing phase with, 
on average, higher recommended sentencing ranges than white defendants 
who committed the same criminal conduct. As a result, for any particular 
recommended guidelines range, the Black defendants in that range will have 
committed less serious offense conduct than the white defendants. If a 
researcher then estimates racial sentencing disparity while controlling for the 
defendant’s recommended sentencing range, the researcher will 
underestimate true Black–white disparity. Put another way, when a 
researcher obtains estimates of disparity after controlling for the defendant’s 
recommended guidelines range, those estimates do not represent the type of 
disparity that the law is usually interested in: the disparity between people 
who have committed the same criminal conduct.131 Instead, it simply 
 
 127 See, e.g., Mustard, supra note 20, at 298–303 (describing estimates of racial disparity in federal 
sentencing that control for education, income, citizenship, number of dependents, and age).  
 128 See Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity: Assessing 
the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2, 16–18 (2013) (describing problems 
with the “presumptive sentence” approach, which controls for defendants’ presumptive sentences in 
estimating racial disparities in sentencing). 
 129 See id. at 19–20. 
 130 Id. at 19. 
 131 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (commanding courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct” when 
sentencing defendants); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H 
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represents disparity between people who are in the same recommended 
guidelines range. 
Because the detention decision happens early in the timeline of a case, 
it has the power to influence everything that happens later in a case. Prior 
work by the author has shown that pretrial detention can affect, for example, 
the chance that a defendant earns a below-guidelines sentence or a 
substantial assistance reduction for their cooperation with the government.132 
A regression that controls for outcomes that pretrial release can itself affect 
(such as whether the defendant receives a substantial assistance reduction) 
will generate estimates that will usually understate the true extent of 
unwarranted disparity. 
I address the overcontrolling problem by controlling for many 
characteristics of individual defendants and their cases that are largely fixed 
at the time the case commences that are likely to affect pretrial detention. 
These variables include the defendant’s age, education level, indigence, and 
criminal record. My analysis also controls for time and geography by 
including variables for the precise courthouse and year in which the 
defendant was prosecuted. These variables are “fixed” in the sense that they 
cannot be manipulated as the case progresses. 
I also control for offense severity because the severity of the offense 
likely contributes to a judge’s decision on whether to detain. However, as 
just described, offense severity is not “fixed,” and itself may be a product of 
racism or sexism in charging and in applying adjustments to the defendant’s 
recommended sentence range while the case progresses. To capture offense 
severity, I therefore control for the defendant’s base offense level. The base 
offense level is a number between 1 and 43 that largely reflects the severity 
of the defendant’s charged conduct.133 Although it will reflect unwarranted 
disparity in the charging decision, it is the best measure for offense severity. 
Indeed, Professors Starr and Rehavi describe the base offense level as “an 
improvement over the presumptive sentence approach” and “probably the 
best approach possible using only the sentencing-stage data from the 
Sentencing Commission.”134 In the end, I err on the side of overcontrolling, 
and I interpret the results as evidence of significant, unwarranted disparity, 
with the understanding that the results likely understate the true amount of 
disparity due to the inclusion of base offense level as a control variable. 
 
(2018) (discussing the importance of avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities when sentencing 
defendants). 
 132 Didwania, supra note 12, at 45 tbl.4.  
 133 The base offense level does not purely capture charging severity because it also incorporates 
judicial fact-finding. 
 134 Starr & Rehavi, supra note 128, at 20. 
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A third obstacle is the possibility of selection bias. Analyzing federal 
sentencing data excludes defendants who are not ultimately sentenced, as 
well as people who were not prosecuted at all. The estimates of disparity 
presented here—as in nearly all studies of disparity—are estimates of 
disparity conditional on these prior selection processes. 
III. RACE- AND GENDER-BASED DISPARITY IN FEDERAL  
PRETRIAL DETENTION 
This Part examines pretrial detention in the federal criminal system. 
Section III.A presents figures summarizing pretrial detention disparity in the 
raw data. Section III.B contains the main empirical analysis. That Section 
begins by documenting unexplained disparity by race and gender separately. 
The empirical analysis finds unexplained racial and gender disparity, 
meaning that defendants of color have worse outcomes than white 
defendants, and male defendants have worse outcomes than female 
defendants. Section III.B then emphasizes the importance of considering 
intersectional disparity. It demonstrates that a naïve analysis that does not 
account for race–gender intersectionality will present an overly simplified 
view of disparity in pretrial detention. 
A. A Preliminary Look at Detention Disparity in the Raw Data 
Before turning to regression results, this Section examines pretrial 
detention in the data and finds that pretrial detention rates are not uniform 
across defendants. Figure 1 displays rates of pretrial detention by race and 
gender. Black defendants are detained at the highest overall rate (68%), 
followed by Hispanic defendants (64% overall), then white defendants (51% 
overall). Male defendants (striped bars) are detained at significantly higher 
rates than female defendants (crosshatched bars) across all racial groups. 
Gender disparity is greatest, however, among Black defendants: Black 
women are detained at the lowest rate of any race–gender group (30% 
detained) while Black men are detained at the highest rate (75% detained). 
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FIGURE 1: PRETRIAL DETENTION BY RACE/ETHNICITY AND GENDER 
 
Figure 2 depicts the rates of pretrial detention by race and gender over 
time. Each data point is the average rate of pretrial detention in that race–
gender group over a fiscal year. The race–gender trends are labeled with 
abbreviations. The first initial indicates the group’s race or ethnicity and the 
second initial indicates the gender group. Detention appears to be relatively 
stable over time for each group, although there is an upward trend (increased 
detention over time) for white men and white women. 
While Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate differences in pretrial detention 
rates, it is important to remember that systematic differences in the offending 
behavior and criminal records between different racial and gender groups 
could account for at least some of these differences. The empirical analysis 
that follows thus includes many control variables in an attempt to isolate 
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FIGURE 2: PRETRIAL DETENTION BY RACE/ETHNICITY AND GENDER OVER TIME 
Note. Average rates of pretrial detention for defendants sentenced in fiscal years 2002 through 
2016. The first initial represents the defendant’s race/ethnicity (B=Black; H=Hispanic; 
W=white). The second initial represents the defendant’s gender (F=female; M=male). 
B. Unexplained Race- and Gender-Based Disparity in Pretrial Detention 
This Section presents the main empirical analysis. Section III.B.1 
provides evidence that unexplained disparity in pretrial detention status 
based on race and gender separately (that is, male–female, Black–white, and 
Hispanic–white disparity) favors white defendants and female defendants. 
Section III.B.2 considers disparity based on intersectional race–gender 
groups and finds that racial disparity for male defendants is different than for 
female defendants. While racial disparity among men favors white 















115:1261 (2021) Discretion and Disparity in Federal Detention 
1293 
1. Race- and Gender-Based Disparities, Separately 
The first set of regressions separately assesses unwarranted racial and 
gender disparities in pretrial detention. In these regressions,135 the control 
variables include the defendant’s age; the defendant’s level of education (no 
high school, high school only, some college, or college graduate); whether a 
weapon was charged; whether the defendant’s fines were waived; the type 
of offense (from fifteen types); the month and year that the case was initiated; 
the fiscal year in which the defendant was sentenced; the courthouse in which 
the case was prosecuted; and the defendant’s precise criminal history 
category-by-offense level cell. The coefficient estimates presented in the 
Tables are interpreted as percentage-point differences. Regressions results 
with additional, even more fine-grained controls are presented as robustness 
checks in Appendix B.136 
After including all of these controls, the regressions produce estimates 
of race- and gender-based disparity, which are presented visually in Figure 
3. The point for each defendant characteristic (Male, Black, Hispanic, Other 
Race) represents the expected increase or decrease in the probability of 
detention after controlling for the variables listed above. The points in Figure 
3 thus reflect unexplained disparity. 
For male defendants, the point estimate lies at 0.089, which suggests 
that male defendants are 8.9 percentage points more likely to be detained 
pending trial than similarly situated female defendants after controlling for 
the complete set of control variables listed above. Similarly, Black 
defendants are 2.8 percentage points more likely and Hispanic defendants 
are 4.6 percentage points more likely to be detained than similarly situated 
white defendants. Defendants of another race, on the other hand, experience 
no unexplained disparity in pretrial detention relative to white defendants, as 
their point in Figure 3 hovers very close to zero at –0.6 percentage points.137 
A disparity estimate is statistically significant at the 95% level if the 
vertical bars extending from the point do not cross the x-axis. Thus, male–
female, Black–white, and Hispanic–white disparities are all statistically 
significant. The only group for whom detention disparity is not statistically 
significant is defendants of another race, who experienced no increased or 
decreased likelihood of detention relatively to similarly situated white 
defendants. 
 
 135 All regressions are linear probability models so that the coefficient estimates presented in the 
Tables are interpreted as percentage-point differences. 
 136 The robustness controls include narrow offense categories (eighty-eight offense types), the 
defendant’s five-digit home zip code, and the average income in the defendant’s home zip code. See infra 
Appendix B. 
 137 See infra Table 2, column 6. 
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FIGURE 3: ESTIMATES OF GENDER AND RACE DISPARITIES IN PRETRIAL DETENTION 
Table 2 shows the raw results of several regression analyses using 
various sets of controls. Each column presents the results of one regression. 
As a reader moves across the table from column 1 to column 6, the regression 
results include an increasing number of control variables, as indicated in the 
bottom rows of the Table. Column 6 contains the results using the full set of 
controls, which are plotted in Figure 3. Column 1 presents estimates when 
there are no control variables and finds significantly larger detention 
disparities than in the regression in which all control variables are included 
in column 6. For example, male–female disparity without full controls is 29.0 
percentage points. As described in the prior paragraph, male–female 
disparity with full controls is 8.9 percentage points. This means that roughly 
70% of the male–female detention gap can be explained by other variables 
in the data, while the remaining 30% of the gap is left unexplained. Similarly, 
the control variables explain roughly 82% of the Black–white gap and 
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATES OF RACE AND GENDER DISPARITIES IN PRETRIAL DETENTION 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Race and Gender 
Male 0.290*** 0.162*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.101*** 0.089***  
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Black 0.158*** 0.041*** 0.008 0.008 0.031*** 0.028***  
(0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) 
Hispanic 0.124*** 0.108*** 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.067*** 0.046***  
(0.017) (0.012) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.005) 
Other  0.029 0.050* 0.008 0.006 -0.007 -0.006 
Race/Ethnicity (0.028) (0.026) (0.015) (0.015) (0.005) (0.006) 
       
Other Defendant  
and Case Characteristics 
Age - - -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***    
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
HS Only - - -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.032***    
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Some College - - -0.068*** -0.069** -0.067*** -0.061***    
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
College Grad - - -0.103*** -0.100*** -0.092*** -0.078***    
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Weapon Charged - - 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.129*** 0.104***    
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Fines Waived - - 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.065*** 
 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Control Variables 
Criminal History No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Offense Type (15 
categories) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Starting 
Month/Year  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Sentencing Fiscal 
Year  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Courthouse  No No No No Yes Yes 
Criminal History 
× Severity No No No No No Yes 
 
      
Observations 337,916 337,916 337,916 337,916 337,916 334,987 
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Note. OLS regressions of whether a defendant was detained pretrial on demographic 
characteristics, case characteristics, and fixed effects as indicated. ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: 
p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered at the courthouse level and reported in parentheses. The 
offense category includes fixed effects for fifteen distinct offense types. Column 6 has fewer 
observations due to missing data in the base-offense-level variable and restricting to base-offense-
level–criminal-history cells with at least 20 observations. 
 
 
Column 5 is the first column in Table 2 in which geographic controls 
are added to the regression. Compared to column 4, adding geographic 
controls has little effect on the estimate of male–female disparity, but 
significantly changes the estimates of Black–white and Hispanic–white 
disparity by increasing these disparity estimates. The reason why controlling 
for geography affects the coefficient estimates for the race and ethnicity but 
not gender variables is because geographic regions tend to be segregated on 
the basis of race and ethnicity but not on the basis of gender. That the 
estimates on the race variables increased when geographic controls were 
added suggests that regions of the country with larger minority populations 
also have lower rates of detention. 
2. Intersectional Race–Gender Detention Disparity 
Especially because the above regression analysis found disparity by 
both race and gender, it is important to analyze the intersection of the two. 
As Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw explained more than thirty years ago, 
“[D]ominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think about 
subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis.”138 
Professor Crenshaw rejected this “single-axis framework” and argued that 
the failure of courts and advocates to consider the intersectionality of gender 
and race has obscured discrimination that does not result from one discrete 
source.139 Professor Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality observes and 
critiques the ways in which the experiences of Black women are often 
excluded or minimized in discussions about racial discrimination.140 
Recognizing, as Professor Paul Butler explains, “that discrimination against 
 
 138 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Gender: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
139, 140. 
 139 Id. 
 140 For example, the #SayHerName campaign underscores instances of police violence towards 
Black women. See #SayHerName Campaign, AFR. AM. POL’Y F., https://aapf.org/sayhername 
[https://perma.cc/4KDM-F8NP]; see also, e.g., Christina Maxouris, Cases Like Breonna Taylor’s 
Highlight Black Women Are ‘Not Safe Anywhere,’ #SayHerName Campaign Founder Says, CNN (Sept. 
25, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/25/us/breonna-taylor-say-her-name-founder/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/J3QS-DKHV]. 
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[B]lack men sometimes might take different forms than discrimination 
against [B]lack women,” and that “gender matters for [B]lack men[,] as 
well,” this Section explores intersectional disparity.141 It finds that the 
intersectional race–gender group to which a defendant belongs is a more 
pertinent unit of analysis for pretrial detention disparity than the defendant’s 
race or gender alone. 
As Figure 1 demonstrates, in the raw data, gender disparity varies by 
race and racial disparity varies by gender. For example, gender disparity is 
most pronounced for Black defendants: Black male defendants are detained 
at the highest rate of any group (75%) and Black female defendants are 
detained at the lowest rate of any group (30%). In contrast, gender 
differences among white defendants are smaller: 55% of white men are 
detained, while 36% of white women are detained. Among female 
defendants—at least in the raw data—Black–white disparity takes on the 
opposite sign than some might expect: Black women are less likely to be 
detained than Hispanic and white women. Any thoughtful analysis of pretrial 
detention disparity, then, ought to consider gender and race as an 
intersectional group, rather than as separate, unrelated characteristics. 
Figure 4 plots the race–gender results. The points are plotted from the 
results of the intersectional regression with the same full set of controls used 
in the previous regression analysis.142 These results are reported in Table 3. 
Each point in Figure 4 represents the unexplained difference in the 
probability of pretrial detention for that race–gender group relative to white 
female defendants. Because white female defendants are the reference group, 
this group is not included in Figure 4. As above, the first initial of the group 
abbreviation indicates race or ethnicity. 
A point that lies above the red line (that is, greater than zero) indicates 
that defendants in that race–gender group were more likely to be detained 
pending trial than similarly situated white female defendants. A point below 
the red line (that is, less than zero) indicates that similarly situated defendants 
in that race–gender group were less likely to be detained than white female 
defendants. 
The vertical bars extending from each point in Figure 4 represent 95% 
confidence intervals around the estimate. If either of the vertical bars crosses 
 
 141 PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 8–9 (2017). 
 142 The full set of controls include: the defendant’s age; the defendant’s level of education (no high 
school, high school only, some college, or college graduate); whether a weapon was charged; whether the 
defendant’s fines were waived; the type of offense (from fifteen types); the month and year that the case 
was initiated; the fiscal year in which the defendant was sentenced; the courthouse in which the case was 
prosecuted; and the defendant’s precise criminal history category-by-base-offense level cell. 
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the red line (that is, if zero is included in the 95% confidence interval), the 
difference in detention probability between the race–gender group and white 
female defendants is not statistically significant. 
Male defendants in all racial groups are more likely to be detained 
pending trial than white women, as demonstrated by the fact that their 
corresponding points all lie well above the red line at zero in Figure 4. The 
detention outcomes are the worst for Hispanic and Black men, and 
significantly better for white men and men of another race. Because male 
defendants comprise 85% of federal criminal defendants, racial disparity 
among men mirrors racial disparity in the full sample: white men are 
detained less often than similarly situated Black and Hispanic men and at 
nearly identical rates as men of another race. 
The results for female defendants present a different pattern. For 
Hispanic female defendants and female defendants who are another race, the 
95% confidence intervals include zero, which means there is not a 
statistically significant difference in the probability of detention for white 
versus Hispanic women, and there is not a statistically significant difference 
in the probability of detention for white women versus women of another 
race. Black female defendants are the only group whose point falls below the 
red line, which means Black women are significantly less likely to be 
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 FIGURE 4: ESTIMATES OF RACE–GENDER DISPARITY IN PRETRIAL DETENTION  
  
Table 3 presents the full regression results that are displayed in Figure 
4. The outcome variable indicates whether the defendant was detained 
pending trial, and the key explanatory variables are the race–gender groups. 
White women—the reference category—are omitted, and the coefficients 
estimates for each race–gender group represents the increased or decreased 
probability of detention in that group relative to similarly situated white 
women. The coefficients from column 6—the regression with the full set of 
controls—are plotted in Figure 4. 
Interpreting race-based disparity among female defendants is 
straightforward because white women are the omitted race–gender group in 
Table 3. Therefore, the coefficient estimate on the Black-female variable  
(–0.032 in column 6) indicates that Black women are 3.2 percentage points 
less likely to be detained pending trial than similarly situated white women. 
This difference is highly statistically significant. In contrast, Hispanic 
women are not detained at statistically different rates than similarly situated 
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TABLE 3: ESTIMATES OF DISPARITIES IN PRETRIAL DETENTION BY RACE–GENDER INTERACTION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Race and Gender 
Black and Female -0.064*** -0.074*** -0.064*** -0.060*** -0.038*** -0.032***  
(0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Hispanic and  0.024 0.052*** 0.011 0.011 0.024*** 0.007 
Female (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) 
Other Race and  -0.006 0.025 0.002 0.002 -0.015* -0.004 
Female (0.027) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.008) (0.008) 
Black and Male 0.383*** 0.171*** 0.082*** 0.086*** 0.113*** 0.101***  
(0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Hispanic and  0.329*** 0.228*** 0.127*** 0.131*** 0.145*** 0.116*** 
Male (0.020) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Other Race and  0.219*** 0.162*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.061*** 0.053*** 
Male (0.030) (0.028) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) 
White and Male 0.184*** 0.107*** 0.058*** 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.060***  
(0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
       
Other Defendant 
and Case Characteristics 
Age - - -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***    
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
HS Only - - -0.036*** -0.037*** -0.034*** -0.032***    
(0.003 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Some College - - -0.067*** -0.068*** -0.067*** -0.060***    
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
College Grad - - -0.102*** -0.099*** -0.091*** -0.077***    
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Weapon Charged - - 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.103***    
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Fines Waived - - 0.085*** 0.084*** 0.080*** 0.065*** 
 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) 
Control Variables 
Criminal History  No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Offense Type (15 
categories) No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Starting 
Month/Year  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Sentencing Year  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Courthouse  No No No No Yes Yes 
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Criminal History 
× Severity No No No No No Yes 
 
      
Observations 337,916 337,916 337,916 337,916 337,916 334,987 
Note. OLS regressions of whether a defendant was detained pretrial on demographic characteristics, 
case characteristics, and fixed effects as indicated. ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.10. Standard 
errors are clustered at the courthouse level and reported in parentheses. The offense category 
includes fixed effects for fifteen distinct offense types. Column (6) has fewer observations due to 
missing data in the base offense level variable and restricting to base offense level–criminal history 
cells with at least 20 observations. 
 
 
Because white women make up the reference group, computing race-
based disparity among male defendants requires subtracting the coefficient 
estimates. For example, the coefficient estimate on the white-male variable 
in Table 3, column 6 is 0.060, while the coefficient estimate on the Black-
male variable is 0.101. For men, Black–white disparity is the difference in 
these two numbers: 0.101 and 0.060. Thus, Black men are 4.1 percentage 
points more likely to be detained than similarly situated white defendants. 
Hispanic men are 5.6 percentage points more likely to be detained than 
similarly situated white defendants. Both of these differences are statistically 
significant.143 The next Part considers several possible reasons for these 
findings. 
IV. THE ROOTS OF DISPARITY 
Part III presented evidence of unexplained disparity in federal pretrial 
detention. Overall, it found significant unwarranted racial disparity, which 
favors white defendants and female defendants. This disparity cannot be 
explained by other characteristics of defendants or their cases, or systematic 
detention patterns by geography or over time. Section III.B.2, however, 
included one result that might surprise readers: among women, Black 
defendants are significantly less likely to be detained pending trial than any 
other group, including similarly situated white and Hispanic women. This 
Part evaluates three potential mechanisms that could be generating these 
disparities. 
Several characteristics of pretrial detention decision-making inform this 
Part’s analysis. First, as emphasized in Part I, federal detention decisions are 
the product of nearly unfettered judicial discretion. The Bail Reform Act 
instructs federal magistrate judges to weigh two malleable factors—risk of 
flight and dangerousness—and pretrial detention decisions are very rarely 
 
 143 Results on file with journal.  
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reviewed. Discretionary decisions like these are likely to be subject to two 
behavioral phenomena. 
First, an environment that requires quick decisions with limited 
information could lead judges to make decisions based on bias or heuristics. 
In Section IV.A, I argue that the results are consistent with racial bias against 
men of color. As other empirical work has found, stereotyping can lead to 
racially disparate treatment. I argue that stereotyping is likely to be 
particularly harmful against men of color in the context of pretrial detention 
because the Bail Reform Act instructs judges to evaluate dangerousness, 
which is the content of persistent and prevalent stereotypes about men of 
color. 
Second, I consider the possibility that race- and gender-based 
disparities in pretrial detention stem from earlier disparities in charging. 
There are two ways that charging disparities could influence detention 
disparity. First, as described in Section IV.B.1, detention disparities could 
stem from charging disparity via the detention presumptions contained in the 
1984 Act. The detention presumptions are one of the few ways that the 1984 
Act constrains judicial discretion. If there is racial disparity in which 
defendants face a presumption of detention, this could create racial disparity 
in detention itself. Section IV.B.1, however, does not find evidence that the 
detention presumptions affect racial disparity in detention. 
Charging disparity might also affect detention disparity by creating a 
selected sample. If white people are less likely to be prosecuted than people 
of color for the same underlying criminal conduct, one would expect white 
defendants in the data to be, on average, more serious offenders than 
defendants of color. In this case, selection bias would cause the estimates to 
understate the true magnitude of racial disparity between otherwise similar 
defendants.144 I explore this idea in Section IV.B.2. 
Third, as I explore in Section IV.C, magistrate judges might make 
detention decisions based on their perceptions of the collateral consequences 
of detention on defendants’ lives and livelihoods. Although some collateral 
consequences are outside the formal scope of the Bail Reform Act, detention 
decisions are rarely appealed, usually do not produce a written decision, and 
do not need to be explained in detail by the judge. Section IV.C suggests that 
the results for female defendants can be explained—in part but not whole—
 
 144 Many empirical studies of racial disparity face this potential problem. See, e.g., Starr & Rehavi, 
supra note 129, at 19 (describing this problem). Professors M. Marit Rehavi and Sonja B. Starr make 
progress on this front by using data that includes detailed arrest information. See generally Rehavi & 
Starr, supra note 20. But of course, and as they acknowledge, even detailed arrest information is not a 
perfect measure of a person’s underlying conduct, id. at 1321, and racial discrimination in arrests will 
bias estimates of racial disparity in later processes.  
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by showing that judges appear to be sensitive to the collateral consequences 
of detention, especially for women who are parents. 
A. Racial Bias 
This Section explores the role and form that racial bias against men 
plays in explaining the results. More than 80% of federal criminal defendants 
are men, so race-based disparity across all federal defendants largely reflects 
race-based disparity among male defendants. Recall that Section III.B.2 
showed that Black men are roughly 4 percentage points more likely to be 
detained pending trial and Hispanic men are roughly 5 percentage points 
more likely to be detained pending trial than similarly situated white 
defendants. Male defendants who are another race are virtually equally likely 
to be detained pending trial as white men. In this Section, I argue that racial 
bias could explain racial disparity, especially because the 1984 Act focuses 
detention decisions around dangerousness. 
Research in social psychology has long documented persistent 
stereotypes that associate men of color—especially Black men—with 
criminality and dangerousness.145 As Professor Jennifer Eberhardt explains, 
“[O]ne of the strongest stereotypes in American society associates blacks 
with criminality.”146 In one study, for example, one group of police officers 
was primed to think about crime, while a separate control group of officers 
was not.147 After the priming task, all officers were shown a screen with one 
white male face and one Black male face. The officers who were prompted 
to think about crime during the priming task were more likely to look at the 
Black male face, while officers in the control group were more likely to look 
at the white male face. The authors concluded that priming the officers to 
think about crime drew their attention to Black male faces, demonstrating 
“the influence of strong, stereotypic associations on face processing 
mechanisms in particular.”148 
Racial stereotypes do not just involve crime in general but are also 
specific to dangerousness. People are more likely to view Black men as 
 
 145 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Phillip Atiba Goff, Valerie J. Purdie & Paul G. Davies, Seeing 
Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 876, 889–91 (2004); 
Mary Beth Oliver, African American Men as “Criminal and Dangerous”: Implications of Media 
Portrayals of Crime on the “Criminalization” of African American Men, 7 J. AFR. AM. STUD. 3, 4 (2003); 
BUTLER, supra note 141, at 2124.  
 146 JENNIFER L. EBERHARDT, BIASED: UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE THAT SHAPES WHAT 
WE SEE, THINK, AND DO 6 (2019). 
 147 Eberhardt et al., supra note 145, at 886. 
 148 Id. at 888. A similar study with undergraduate participants produced the same results. Id. at 882–
83. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1304 
taller, heavier, and stronger than white men, even if the photo only shows 
faces, or if the skin tone is racially ambiguous and the research participant is 
only told of the person’s race.149 White participants are more likely to rate 
Black men as capable of harm than white men of the same size and stature.150 
Stereotypical associations also link Black men with weapons. Undergraduate 
students were quicker to identify photos of weapons after being primed with 
Black faces than white faces but exhibited no difference in how quickly they 
could identify objects that were not weapons.151 A setting like pretrial 
detention—where a magistrate judge must form predictions about a person’s 
future dangerousness—is ripe for racial bias, which is likely to be 
particularly harmful for men of color. 
Quantitative empirical scholars have also exhaustively documented 
racial disparities at every stage of the criminal process, from policing, to 
charging, to conviction, and to sentencing.152 This prior work does not simply 
find that Black people are overrepresented at each stage of the criminal 
process compared to the U.S. population, but also that Black defendants are 
disproportionately represented compared to observably similar white 
defendants. The breadth of these findings—across different federal and state 
court systems, different parts of the country, and different types of 
offenses—suggests persistent disparate treatment of minority defendants, 
which has led many to conclude that racial bias is responsible. Some of this 
research is directly applicable to the findings here. Recent work by 
Professors David Arnold, Will Dobbie, and Crystal Yang found that racial 
disparity in bail in two state courts is likely the product of judges making 
racially biased prediction errors.153 The authors explain that if judges 
disproportionately detain Black defendants, one would expect to see fewer 
Black defendants committing pretrial violations, which is what the study 
found. Professors Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang’s theory of bias, developed by 
others in earlier work on racial stereotypes, is that if minority defendants are 
 
 149 John Paul Wilson, Kurt Hugenberg & Nicholas O. Rule, Racial Bias in Judgments of Physical 
Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat, 113 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 59, 74–75 (2017).  
 150 Id. 
 151 Eberhardt et al., supra note 145, at 880. 
 152 See supra note 13. 
 153 Arnold et al., supra note 15, at 1917–18. In contrast, some earlier work suggests that Black 
defendants are not subject to higher bail amounts than white defendants after controlling for defendants’ 
criminal records and specific charges, and that Black defendants are not more likely to be detained 
pending trial than white defendants after controlling for the probability of rearrest for violent crime. Frank 
McIntyre & Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Pretrial Detention, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
741, 769 (2013). These findings, however, might underestimate racial disparities if racial bias influences 
these rearrest rates. 
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overrepresented among the most serious offenders, but roughly similar to 
white defendants in offense severity on average, judges will overestimate the 
severity of all minority defendants because of stereotyping.  
Given the rarity at which federal defendants fail to appear in court or 
are rearrested while released,154 Professor Arnold, Dobbie, and Yang’s test 
of racial bias is not well suited to this study.155 Still, the principles animating 
their findings can be applied here. As the authors noted, in their research 
setting, “mostly untrained bail judges must make on-the-spot judgments with 
limited information and little to no interaction with defendants. These 
institutional features may make bail decisions particularly prone to the kind 
of inaccurate stereotypes or categorical heuristics that exacerbate racial 
bias.”156  
B. Charging Decisions 
 As described in Part III, the data used in the empirical analysis 
encompasses federal defendants who are ultimately sentenced under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. As a result, the empirical analysis does not account 
for any disparity that occurs earlier in the case, including in policing and 
charging. Instead, the disparity results are conditional on being sentenced 
under the Guidelines. This Section explores two ways in which the empirical 
results might be generated—or undermined—by disparity earlier in the 
criminal process. 
1. The Presumption of Detention 
As described in Part II, the 1984 Act establishes a rebuttable 
presumption of detention for certain arrestees. The rebuttable presumption is 
one of the few tools in the Bail Reform Act that cabins judicial discretion. 
The presumption of detention largely applies to defendants facing mandatory 
 
 154 See COHEN, supra note 91, at 13 and accompanying text. 
 155 In contrast to the federal system, where the most recent statistics report that 4% of released 
defendants are rearrested for a new offense, COHEN, supra note 91, at 13, Professor Arnold and his 
coauthors document that 24% of released defendants are rearrested prior to disposition in their study of 
pretrial detention in Philadelphia and Miami-Dade counties, Arnold et al., supra note 15, at 1907. 
 156 Arnold et al., supra note 15, at 1887 (first citing Roland Fryer & Matthew O. Jackson, A 
Categorical Model of Cognition and Biased Decision Making, 8 B.E.J. THEORETICAL ECON. 1 (2008); 
and then citing Pedro Bordalo, Katherine Coffman, Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Stereotypes, 
131 Q.J. ECON. 1753 (2016)); see also Aurélie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial 
Misconduct: The Influence of Prosecutors 5 (June 22, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3335138 [https://perma.cc/TD2C-T8EU] (evaluating Philadelphia’s 
prosecutor-led bail reform and concluding that “[judicial] discretion can dilute reform’s impacts, and lead 
to racial disparity in the allocation of its benefits”). 
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minimum sentences for drug and firearms offenses.157 Prior empirical 
scholarship has found racial disparities in mandatory-minimum charging.158 
It is therefore plausible that race- and gender-based disparities in pretrial 
detention could be generated through the presumptions of detention 
contained in the 1984 Act, which largely apply to defendants facing 
mandatory minimum sentences for drug and firearms offenses. This Section 
investigates this theory and finds that, although Black and Hispanic men are 
more likely to be subject to presumptive detention than similarly situated 
white men, this does not appear to explain race-based disparity in detention. 
To carry out this analysis, I code whether each defendant is likely to be 
subject to a presumption of detention based on the charges brought against 
them.159 Appendix A provides details about how this variable is coded. In all, 
roughly 46% of defendants are coded as likely to be subject to the 
presumption, which is very similar to other studies’ estimates of the 
presumption’s prevalence in the federal criminal-defendant population.160 
48% of men and 33% of women are coded as subject to the presumption in 
the data. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 suggest race-based disparity in the 
prevalence of the presumption for male defendants. The results for male 
defendants are found in column 2. Black and Hispanic men are around 1.5 
percentage points more likely to face a presumption than similarly situated 
white defendants. This disparity is smaller than overall Black–white and 
Hispanic–white detention disparity for male defendants (4.1 percentage 
points and 5.6 percentage points respectively), so the presumption will 
potentially be, at most, an incomplete explanation for detention disparity 
among male defendants. 
For female defendants, reported in column 1, neither Black nor 
Hispanic women are more likely to face a presumption than similarly 
situated white defendants—the point estimates are close to zero and 
statistically insignificant. Because similarly situated Black, Hispanic, and 
white women face the presumption at indistinguishable rates, one would not 
expect the presumption to influence Black–white or Hispanic–white 
detention disparity for women.  
 
 157 See supra Section I.B.2. 
 158 See Rehavi & Starr, supra note 20, at 1323; Yang, supra note 20, at 108; Joshua B. Fischman & 
Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial Disparities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The Role of Judicial 
Discretion and Mandatory Minimums, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 729, 730 (2012). 
 159 Because the presumption depends in part on the nature of the defendant’s prior convictions—
which are not coded in the data—the variable is not a perfect measure of whether a defendant is subject 
to the presumption. 
 160 Austin, supra note 11, at 55 (estimating that between fiscal years 2005 and 2015, the Drug and 
Firearm presumption applied to between 42% and 45% of cases).  
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(no presumption control) 
(control for 
presumption) 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Black -0.001 0.014*** -0.027*** 0.040*** -0.027*** 0.039***  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Hispanic -0.005 0.016*** 0.017** 0.053*** 0.018** 0.051***  
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) 
Other Race  -0.010** -0.001 -0.006 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008  
(0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
Presumption - - - - 0.125*** 0.082*** 
     (0.013) (0.005) 
       
Observations 54,943 281,822 54,943 281,822 54,536 281,822 
Note. OLS regressions of whether a defendant was detained pretrial. ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: 
p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered at the courthouse level and reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include controls listed in Table 2, column 6. 
 
  
Columns 3 through 6 demonstrate that the presumption of detention 
does not appear to influence detention disparity. These columns compare the 
estimates of intersectional detention disparity from the main analysis 
described in Part III with analogous estimates that also control for whether 
the defendant faced a presumption of detention. The regressions are 
separated by gender due to likely differences in racial disparity between male 
and female defendants, as described in Section III.B.2. The regression results 
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4 suggest that the presumption is an important 
predictor of detention—it increases the probability of detention by 8.2 
percentage points for men and 12.5 percentage points for women, even after 
controlling for all of the control variables included in the main analysis, 
including (but not limited to) the defendant’s base offense level, criminal-
history category, and whether a weapon was charged. Columns 3 through 6 
show, however, that adding this control variable leaves the disparity 
estimates virtually unchanged, which suggests that the presumption does not 
offer much explanatory power over race- and gender-based disparity in 
pretrial detention. 
2. Underlying Conduct 
The data include defendants who were sentenced under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. Put another way, the data exclude defendants who 
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were acquitted and whose charges were voluntarily dismissed by the 
government. The data also excludes people who prosecutors affirmatively 
declined to prosecute, people who were convicted of certain misdemeanors 
or petty offenses, or whose criminal activity was unknown to prosecutors. 
All of the estimates contained in this Article are conditional—they represent 
race- and gender-based disparity conditional on these earlier selection 
processes. 
These earlier selection processes—whose criminal behavior is detected, 
which cases are declined, whose charges are dismissed, and who is 
acquitted—might themselves be infected by racial discrimination. If these 
earlier selection processes are discriminatory against people of color, the 
regression analyses contained here will underestimate racial disparity. If 
these earlier selection processes are discriminatory against men, the 
regression analyses contained here will underestimate gender disparity. 
Without data on the underlying conduct of people, including those who 
are not charged with a federal crime, one cannot know how severe the 
underestimates are. At the least, it suggests that the results among male 
defendants are likely to understate the true magnitude of racial disparity. For 
female defendants, in which racial disparity favors Black women, the 
possibility of selection bias suggests that one should be cautious in viewing 
these results. 
C. Collateral Consequences 
Detaining a person pending trial creates many abrupt collateral 
consequences. For example, detention interrupts a detainee’s employment, 
housing, medical treatment, and community ties. Because federal judges 
enjoy wide discretion in detention decisions, they might be influenced by the 
perceived collateral consequences of detaining or releasing defendants. This 
Section presents evidence that is suggestive of such influence. 
Perhaps the most severe consequences of pretrial detention are the 
consequences for children and parents who are separated while the parent is 
detained. Nearly three million of America’s seventy-four million children 
have at least one parent who is held in carceral custody.161 More than one-
third of these children have a parent who is held in local jail—the facilities 
typically used for pretrial detention and to incarcerate those serving short 
sentences.162 When a child’s parent is held in physical custody—especially 
 
 161 PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC 
MOBILITY 18 (2010) (stating that there are 2.7 million children with parents in criminal custody). 
 162 See Kevin Johnson, Who’s Watching the Kids When Parents Get Arrested?, USA TODAY (July 
31, 2014, 7:55 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/07/31/children-left-behind-
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with little warning—several immediate and long-term consequences follow 
for both the child and the parent. 
If the detained parent is the only custodial parent of a minor child, they 
must immediately try to arrange for a relative or friend to care for their child 
or children, which, unsurprisingly, can be very difficult for a parent to do 
when they are arrested.163 If the parent is able to secure a family member or 
friend to care for the child, that caregiver must be approved by the state’s 
child-protection agency. If no family members or friends are available and 
approved, the child or children will be placed in a temporary foster home. As 
one might expect, this process is extremely hard on children. Much social-
science research has documented associations between parental 
incarceration and behavioral, emotional, and economic instability for 
children.164  
The consequences of pretrial detention can also be devastating for 
parents. Under the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, states must move 
to sever a parent’s parental rights after a child has spent fifteen of the last 
twenty-two months in foster care (the 15/22 rule).165 Roughly one out of eight 
incarcerated parents lose their parental rights regardless of the severity of 
their offenses166—depriving these parents of what the U.S. Supreme Court 
has described as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized” by the Due Process Clause.167 
 
parents-arrested/13333909/ [https://perma.cc/JB6X-NY3F] (reporting that 1.7 million children have a 
parent in prison, and this “number of children jumps to about 2.7 million when parents detained in local 
jails are included”).  
 163 See, e.g., Incarcerated Parents Manual: Arrest, LEGAL SERVS. FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILD., 
http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/pubs/ipm/arrest.htm [https://perma.cc/G3YQ-SXVR] (describing 
what happens to children after their parent is arrested in California).  
 164 See, e.g., Yvonne Humenay Roberts, Frank J. Snyder, Joy S. Kaufman, Meghan K. Finley, Amy 
Griffin, Janet Anderson, Tim Marshall, Susan Radway, Virginia Stack & Cindy A. Crusto, Children 
Exposed to the Arrest of a Family Member: Associations with Mental Health, 23 J. CHILD FAM. STUD. 
214, 219–20 (2014) (finding that exposure to the arrest of a family member is significantly associated 
with behavioral and emotional challenges for children); Amanda Geller, Irwin Garfinkel, Carey E. Cooper 
& Ronald B. Mincy, Parental Incarceration and Child Well-Being: Implications for Urban Families, 
90 SOC. SCI. Q. 1186, 1198–1200 (2009) (finding increased economic and residential instability for 
children of incarcerated parents).  
165 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
 166 Eli Hager & Anna Flagg, How Incarcerated Parents Are Losing Their Children Forever, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2018, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/12/03/how-
incarcerated-parents-are-losing-their-children-forever [https://perma.cc/4FMK-E4CF]. 
 167 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“The liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest 
of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by this Court.”). 
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The Adoption and Safe Families Act includes three exceptions to the 
15/22 rule. A state agency is not required to move to terminate parental rights 
if (1) a relative is caring for the child, (2) the foster care agency has not 
provided appropriate services, or (3) termination would not be in the child’s 
best interests. To succeed on prong 3, a parent will typically need to 
demonstrate regular contact with their caseworker and frequent visits with 
their child, which is, of course, extremely difficult when a parent is detained. 
For example, in the United States, a person held in jail can expect a fifteen-
minute phone call home to cost around $6, and in some jurisdictions more 
than $20.168 
This Section tests the hypothesis that familial status in part explains the 
finding that Black–white disparity among women favors Black defendants. 
Although the statistics are dated, in 2004 white women who were 
incarcerated in federal prisons were less likely to be parents of minor 
children than Black and Hispanic women. Forty-seven percent of white 
women in federal prison reported having minor children, compared to 55% 
of Black women and 63% of Hispanic women.169 Although the Commission 
data report the defendant’s number of dependents rather than minor children, 
the statistics are similar.170 On average, Black mothers are also more likely 
to parent without a partner than Hispanic or non-Hispanic white mothers.171 
These statistics suggest that pretrial detention is likely to be especially 
harmful for Black women and their dependents.172 And as Professor Dorothy 
 
 168 The average was computed by the author from Appendix Table 2 in Peter Wagner & Alexi Jones, 
State of Phone Justice: Local Jails, State Prisons and Private Phone Providers, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE 
(Feb. 2019), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/appendix_table_2.html [https://perma.cc/5WVD-
XYMF]. 
 169 See LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 14 tbl.3 (2010), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA6U-GY7J].  
 170 In the dataset used in this paper, white women are also the least likely and Hispanic women are 
the most likely to have dependents. In the dataset used here, 54% of white women, 64% of Black women, 
and 66% of Hispanic women have dependents. These rates are not directly comparable with the 
parenthood rates reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, id., both because the data used in this paper 
spans the years 2002 through 2016 and because some defendants in the data might have dependents who 
are not children. 
 171 These are the author’s own calculations from U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S FAMILIES AND 
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2018 tbl.H3 (2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2018/demo/families/
cps-2018.html [https://perma.cc/8GK7-FJHC].   
 172 Grassroots efforts have also sought to address this problem. For example, National Bail Out’s 
#FreeBlackMamas initiative is an annual, nationwide campaign that raises money to pay cash bail for 
Black caregivers who are held in detention on Mother’s Day. History of Black Mama’s Bail Out, NAT’L 
BAIL OUT COLLECTIVE, https://www.nationalbailout.org/history [https://perma.cc/FL3Y-K9RS]; see 
also Erin E. Evans, #FreeBlackMamas Works to Bail Black Mothers Out of Jail in Time for Mother’s 
Day, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2019, 11:16 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/freeBlackmamas-
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Roberts explains, the U.S. prison and foster-care systems intersect to 
uniquely punish Black mothers.173 Magistrate judges might be sensitive to 
these harms. When deciding on detention, federal magistrate judges typically 
have parental information available through the pretrial-services report that 
contains details about the defendant’s social history.174 Although detention 
decisions rarely result in reasoned, written opinions by magistrate and 
district judges, those that do sometimes make note of the defendant’s 
caretaking considerations.175 Thus, familial status might explain the racial 
disparity findings among women defendants. 
I test this possibility with two checks. First, if familial status can help 
explain the intersectional disparity results, one would expect the results 
among women to be stronger for women who are parents than for women 
who are not parents. Second, one would not expect parenthood to be as 
strongly correlated with the intensity of racial disparity among men because 
men are significantly less likely than women to be a sole custodial parent of 
minor children.176 This pattern appears to be replicated among the 
incarcerated population, in which 11% of mothers rely on foster care to 
provide daily care for their children, while only 2% of incarcerated fathers 
 
works-bail-Black-mothers-out-jail-time-mother-s-n1004511 [https://perma.cc/L5UD-7BRP] (describing 
the National Bail Out organization’s #FreeBlackMamas movement and its efforts). 
 173 Dorothy E. Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black Mothers, 
59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1476 (2012). 
 174 18 U.S.C. § 3154 allows pretrial-services officers to collect, verify, and report information from 
defendants and others about bail and to make recommendations to the court as to whether the defendant 
should be detained pending trial.  
 175 See, e.g., United States v. Arias, No. 97-20388, 1997 WL 367860, at *1 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that the district court abused its discretion in denying release and noting that defendant was a single 
mother); United States v. Smith, 34 F. Supp. 3d 541, 544 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (finding a single mother 
presents neither escape nor danger risks in part due to her children); United States v. Hooks, 330 F. Supp. 
2d 1311, 1313–14 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (finding a single mother presents neither escape nor danger risks in 
light of her children and that parental status constitutes “exceptional reasons” warranting release before 
serving sentence); United States v. Hudspeth, 143 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 2001) (considering that 
defendant cares for his elderly mother and supports his fourteen-year-old son as reasons that “weigh 
strongly in favor of pretrial release”); United States v. Lizardi–Maldonado, 275 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1290, 
1300 (D. Utah 2017) (releasing a noncitizen-defendant charged with an immigration offense pending trial 
because he had two citizen-children for whom he was the primary caretaker after the children’s mother 
died of cancer the year before). But see United States v. Stuart, 784 F. App’x 186, 190 (5th Cir. 2019) 
(“That she is a single mother of a teenage daughter should have motivated her to abide by the conditions 
of her pretrial release, rather than, as she argues on appeal, constitute a reason for the district court to 
overlook her noncompliance.”).  
 176 In the United States, households led by fathers without a partner are significantly less prevalent 
than those led by mothers without a partner. According to the most recent census estimates, there are 
more than five times as many households led by a mother with no partner present than households led by 
a father with no partner present. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 171, tbl.H3.  
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rely on foster care.177 As with mothers, Black men are more likely to parent 
without a partner than non-Hispanic white fathers.178 
I first analyze race-based detention disparity by gender and parenthood 
status. In other words, I separately estimate race-based detention disparity 
for women who are parents, women who are not parents, men who are 
parents, and men who are not parents using the same regression strategy 
described in Part III. If judges exercise discretion (on average) in favor of 
single parents, we should see Black and, to a lesser extent, Hispanic women 
who are parents fare better than those who are not parents in disparity relative 
to white women. 
Figure 5 depicts the regression results, which are also contained in 
Table A2. Panel A plots regression results for female defendants, and each 
label includes initials that indicate the defendant’s racial group (B=Black, 
H=Hispanic, O=other race) and whether the defendant was a parent 
(P=parent, N=nonparent). The results are consistent with the theory that 
familial status plays an important role in explaining the racial detention gaps 
among women. As Figure 5 shows, for Black and Hispanic women, the 
estimate of disparity relative to white women is smaller, or lower, for parents 
than for defendants who are not parents. For example, Hispanic women who 
are parents (“HP” in Panel A) have only slightly worse outcomes than 
similarly situated white women, but Hispanic women who are not parents 
(“HN” in Panel A) are much more worse off relative to similarly situated 
white women. Put another way, Black and Hispanic women do better relative 
to white women in the parent population than in the nonparent population. 
Black women are even more likely to be released relative to white women 
when the sample is restricted to defendants with children. Similarly, being a 
parent virtually erases Hispanic–white disparity, which only presents among 
women who are not parents.179 
As predicted, however, this result does not present for male defendants, 
as depicted in Panel B of Figure 5. For male defendants of each racial group, 
the estimates of race-based detention disparity are virtually identical between 
parent and nonparent defendants. These findings suggest that judges are 
sensitive to the spillover consequences for sole custodial parents held in 
detention, who tend to be women, and their children. 
 
 177 CREASIE FINNEY HAIRSTON, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., KINSHIP CARE WHEN PARENTS ARE 
INCARCERATED: WHAT WE KNOW, WHAT WE CAN DO 7 (2009). 
 178 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 171, tbl.H3. 
 179 For Black and Hispanic women, the differences in the estimates of detention disparity for parents 
compared to nonparents are statistically significant. For women who are another race and ethnicity, the 
estimate of detention disparity is lower for women who are not parents, but this difference is not 
statistically significant. Women who are another race and ethnicity make up around 1% of the data. 
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FIGURE 5: ESTIMATED RACE, GENDER, AND PARENTHOOD EFFECTS ON PRETRIAL DETENTION 
    
Panel A. Female Defendants Panel B. Male Defendants 
 
The parenthood explanation, however, is incomplete. Familial status 
does not wholly explain the racial disparity results among women because 
even when restricting attention to women without dependents, Black–white 
detention disparity favors Black women. One possible reason is that—as 
described in Section IV.A—the result could be caused by stereotyping: if 
Black women are more prevalent among caregivers, judges might engage in 
representativeness stereotyping and assume that most Black women are 
caregivers of minor children. 
It is also possible that other collateral costs of detention are more acute 
for Black women. Black women are among the defendants in the criminal 
system with the fewest resources. In the data, for example, Black women are 
more likely to have their fines waived and have on average obtained less 
formal education than white women. Pretrial detention is especially harmful 
for defendants with few resources. An arrested person with a low-wage job 
will not usually be able to return to their employment after the interruption 
of pretrial detention, and an arrested person with little savings will not be 
able to pay housing costs while in detention. 
The results among female defendants therefore suggest that some 
federal magistrate judges might exercise discretion to consider the actual 
impacts of pretrial detention. This finding is buttressed by the fact that this 
disparity pattern among women appears to be a uniquely federal 
phenomenon. Prior empirical scholarship that examines bail in state courts 
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women.180 This difference could derive from the highly discretionary nature 
of detention determinations in federal courts. In most state courts, which rely 
on cash bail, liquid wealth is explicitly connected to release, so people with 
fewer resources are more likely to be detained. Because Black and Hispanic 
women are, on average, less wealthy than white women, disparity at the state 
level is likely driven in part by income differences.181 
It is important to note that the findings do not necessarily imply that 
magistrate judges deviate from the 1984 Act if they do consider these 
impacts. As described in Section I.B, the Act instructs judges to weigh two 
factors in deciding release: (1) the defendant’s risk of nonappearance, and 
(2) the defendant’s risk of posing danger to the community. It seems 
plausible that women with minor children are less likely to abscond. Fleeing 
a jurisdiction is costly and logistically difficult—even more so if a parent is 
the sole caregiver of minor children, or if the person has few resources.182 A 
parent who is also a sole caregiver might be more likely to comply with the 
terms of release. A magistrate judge may properly consider these factors. For 
example, when evaluating the risk of nonappearance, a magistrate judge 
might conclude that primary caregivers are less likely to flee. As discussed 
further below, the double-edged nature of federal detention disparity has 
policy implications for those who seek to reduce race-based disparity in 
pretrial detention determinations at both the federal and state levels. 
V. ADDRESSING INEQUALITY IN FEDERAL DETENTION AND LESSONS FOR 
THE STATES 
 Part IV sought to explain why male defendants are significantly more 
likely to be detained pending trial than otherwise similar female defendants, 
Black and Hispanic male defendants are significantly more likely to be 
 
 180 See, e.g., WILL DOBBIE, JACOB GOLDIN & CRYSTAL S. YANG, ONLINE APPENDIX: THE EFFECTS 
OF PRE-TRIAL DETENTION ON CONVICTION, FUTURE CRIME, AND EMPLOYMENT: EVIDENCE FROM 
RANDOMLY ASSIGNED JUDGES 2 tbl.A2 (2017), https://assets.aeaweb.org/asset-server/files/6277.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NC6C-AQZZ] (presenting summary statistics indicating that the release rate for white 
women was around 65%, while the release rate for Black women was around 58%); Stephen Demuth & 
Darrell Steffensmeier, The Impact of Gender and Race-Ethnicity in the Pretrial Release Process, 51 SOC. 
PROBS. 222, 222–42 (2004) (analyzing pretrial release among a sample of felony defendants in the 
seventy-five most populous U.S. counties over the years 1990–1996 and finding that white women were 
more likely to be released than any other gender–racial/ethnic group). 
 181 For a thoughtful examination of racial disparity in income in the United States, see generally Raj 
Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones & Sonya R. Porter, Race and Economic Opportunity in the 
United States: An Intergenerational Perspective, 135 Q.J. ECON. 711 (2020). 
 182 In this way, the 1984 Act can favor detaining wealthy defendants. See, e.g., United States v. 
Boustani, 932 F.3d 79, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2019) (upholding the district court’s imposition of pretrial 
detention where the defendant frequently traveled internationally, lacked connections in the United States 
compared to his extensive foreign ties, and was extremely wealthy).  
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detained than non-Hispanic white defendants, and Black female defendants 
are significantly less likely to be detained than otherwise similar white 
female defendants. It argued that because federal detention decisions are 
quickly made, highly discretionary, and rarely reviewed, they are likely 
influenced by two potential behavioral responses. First, detention decisions 
are susceptible to bias, and the results are consistent with stereotyping that 
particularly harms minority men. This is perhaps because the Bail Reform 
Act directs judges to consider dangerousness, which is a persistent stereotype 
against men of color. Second, judges appear to be sensitive to some collateral 
consequences of detention, especially for female defendants who are parents. 
Third, for women defendants, it is possible that the disparity results reflect 
racial disparities in the decision to prosecute. 
This Part considers the path ahead. Section V.A explores four potential 
federal reforms that could reduce federal pretrial detention and lessen 
disparity: considering costs in detention decisions, limiting or prohibiting the 
consideration of dangerousness, expanding appellate review, and narrowing 
or eliminating the Bail Reform Act’s presumptions of detention. Section V.B 
applies the Article’s empirical findings to the states, where nearly all efforts 
to reform bail have focused. Section V.B argues that the federal experience 
provides important lessons for these state-level reform efforts. Most 
importantly, states should understand that eliminating cash bail—while a 
crucial first step in reforming pretrial detention—is likely to be insufficient 
to address race disparities in pretrial detention, especially if a state replaces 
its cash-bail system with a regime that permits preventative detention on the 
basis of dangerousness. 
A. Potential Federal Reforms 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the federal criminal system 
overdetains people pending trial. The federal system detains people at an 
extraordinary rate, and federal defendants who are released very rarely 
commit new crimes or fail to appear in court. Even more disturbing, this 
liberty deprivation is unequally imposed across the population, which—
given pretrial detention’s immediate and long-term consequences—likely 
perpetuates inequality throughout the federal criminal process and beyond. 
This Section evaluates the benefits and drawbacks of four possible reforms 
that Congress might implement to improve federal pretrial detention. 
1. Considering Costs 
Congress could reform pretrial detention by amending the Bail Reform 
Act to explicitly allow judges to consider the costs that pretrial detention 
imposes on individual defendants, their dependents, their communities, and 
the public at large. Pretrial detention is extremely costly. In addition to the 
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fiscal costs borne by the public (it costs nearly $27,000 per year to detain a 
person pending trial in the federal system), there is growing evidence of the 
costs that pretrial detention imposes on defendants themselves, their 
dependents, and their local communities.183 But these costs are not expressly 
incorporated into the statutory balancing the Bail Reform Act requires. There 
is no sound reason why the arbiters of pretrial detention decisions should not 
consider those costs. As described in Section IV.C, it is likely that some 
judges already do for some defendants, either consciously or implicitly. 
Making the directive explicit, however, would allow defense attorneys to 
present direct evidence as to costs, and judges could expressly base rulings 
on that evidence. 
The Department of Justice very recently embraced accounting for 
detention’s potential risks in the context of the novel coronavirus epidemic. 
In an April 6, 2020 memorandum to all federal prosecutors entitled 
“Litigating Pre-Trial Detention Issues During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” 
Attorney General William Barr instructed federal prosecutors to weigh the 
risks of COVID-19 against the defendant’s risk of dangerousness and flight 
in making detention recommendations. He instructed prosecutors:  
[Y]ou should now consider the medical risks associated with individuals being 
remanded into federal custody during the COVID-19 pandemic. Even with the 
extensive precautions we are currently taking, each time a new person is added 
to a jail, it presents at least some risk . . . That means you should consider not 
seeking detention to the same degree we would under normal circumstances—
specifically, for those defendants who have not committed serious crimes and 
who present little risk of flight (but no threat to the public) and who are clearly 
vulnerable to COVID-19 under CDC Guidelines. In this analysis, the risk of 
flight and seriousness of the offense must be weighed against the defendant’s 
vulnerability to COVID-19.184  
Barr’s memorandum justified the instruction to consider public-health 
risk—not a traditional factor in determining detention—by citing 18 U.S.C. 
 
 183 Supervision Costs Significantly Less than Incarceration in Federal System, U.S. CTS. (July 18, 
2013), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2013/07/18/supervision-costs-significantly-less-incarceration-
federal-system [https://perma.cc/36L7-W9KX] (reporting that in 2012, pretrial detention cost $26,654.69 
annually per person while pretrial supervision cost $2,643.50 annually per person). For a more expansive 
accounting of pretrial detention’s costs, see Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, 
97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5–7 (2017); Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1399, 1417–28 (2017).  
184 Memorandum from Att’y Gen. William Barr to All Heads of Dep’t Components and All U.S. 
Att’ys 2 (Apr. 6, 2020) [hereinafter Barr Memorandum], https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/ 
1001886/download [https://perma.cc/6Q3M-WAML]. 
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§ 3142(e)(3), which allows judges to consider the person’s “physical and 
mental condition” in determining release.185 
Several progressive prosecutors around the United States have recently 
begun sharing cost information with state sentencing judges.186 For example, 
Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner, a reformist prosecutor elected 
in 2018, instructed the prosecutors in his office to inform judges how much 
recommended prison sentences would cost.187 Philadelphia prosecutors are 
encouraged to compare the costs of a year of incarceration—around $42,000 
in Pennsylvania—with the salary of a starting teacher, police officer, or 
social worker.188 
But the costs of pretrial detention are not just the fiscal costs paid by 
the government.189 They also include costs borne by the defendant, their 
dependents, and their local communities. These costs include those 
associated with loss of income, interruption of housing, job loss, and other 
immediate collateral consequences for the defendant.190 Costs also include 
the consequences of detention for minor children or others for whom the 
defendant is a caregiver. Costs also incorporate the additional harms of 
pretrial detention that recent empirical scholarship has documented—the 
increased probability of conviction and sentence length and the long-term, 
employment-related consequences of detention.191 
Of course, instructing judges to explicitly consider costs raises many 
questions. Does the defendant have to prove their costs? If so, how will 
defendants be expected to do so? How should judges weigh costs against the 
“benefits” of detention (reduced risk of flight and dangerousness)? Although 
directing judges to consider costs would entail some vagaries, it is hard to 
 
 185 Id. 
 186 See, e.g., Samantha Michaels, Should Judges Have to Weigh the Price Tag of Sending Someone 
to Prison?, MOTHER JONES (Jan. 8, 2020), https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/01/judges-
cost-incarceration-district-attorney-biberaj-krasner-boudin/ [https://perma.cc/NR86-PDY8] (discussing 
policies implemented by some progressive prosecutors’ offices to require prosecutors to include the cost 
with their recommended sentence). 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. The article also notes that Chesa Boudin, San Francisco’s recently elected District Attorney, 
plans to introduce a similar policy after taking office in January 2020. Id.  
 189 See Austin, supra note 11, at 53; supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 190 See Austin, supra note 11, at 53; supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also Megan T. 
Stevenson & Sandra G. Mayson, Pretrial Detention and the Value of Liberty 6 (Va. Pub. L. &  Legal 
Theory Rsch. Paper No. 2021-14, 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/a=3787018 [https://perma.cc/K8BP-
SZU6] (presenting survey evidence suggesting “that people view incarceration as an incredibly harmful 
experience” and that most would prefer being a victim of a crime “over even short jail stints,” which 
suggests that pretrial detention is extremely costly to detained people). 
 191 See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
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imagine that these vagaries are any more amorphous than the current 
statutory scheme, as described in Section I.A.  
2. Prohibiting or Limiting Consideration of Dangerousness 
As described in Part I, dating back to at least the thirteenth century, bail 
was designed to ensure that defendants appeared in court. The idea of 
detaining people pending trial based on the risk that they would present 
danger to the community is a fairly recent development—first codified in 
federal law in 1984. As scholars have found, pretrial detention decision-
making today appears to focus more on dangerousness than risk of 
nonappearance.192 In a further step away from bail’s original aims, 
“dangerousness” has been expansively conceptualized to include the risk of 
being rearrested while on release—even for crimes that are not dangerous.193 
Some legal scholars argue that the risk of future dangerousness does not 
justify detaining defendants pending trial on constitutional, moral, or 
practical grounds.194 The federal government, however, takes the opposite 
view. Barr’s recent memorandum relating to detention during the COVID-
19 epidemic also emphasized detention’s important role in preventing 
danger, explaining:  
We simply cannot agree to anything that will put the public at risk. COVID-19 
presents real risks, but so does allowing violent gang members and child 
predators to roam free. When you believe a defendant poses a risk to the safety 
of any person or the community at large, you should continue to seek [detention] 
as zealously today as you would have before the pandemic began, in accordance 
with the [1984 Act’s] plain terms. Protecting the public from criminals is our 
paramount obligation.195 
 
 192 See Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 494 (2018) (finding that the 
focus of bail reform has been limiting pretrial detention to defendants who pose a risk to public safety); 
Shima Baradaran, Race, Prediction, and Discretion, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 157, 163 (2013) (finding 
that judges appear to make release decisions based on defendants’ perceived risk of violent crime more 
than risk of flight); Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 
546–47 (2012) (noting that judges relied more on predictions of dangerousness than on flight risk when 
determining whether to detain or release a defendant).  
 193 For example, the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act seems to suggest that lawmakers 
equated dangerousness with the risk of rearrest. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6 (1983) (stating that the 
“broad base of support for giving judges the authority to weigh risks to community safety in pretrial 
release decisions is a reflection of the deep public concern, which the Committee shares, about the 
growing problem of crimes committed by persons on release,” and citing studies estimating the rates at 
which defendants who were released pending trial were rearrested). 
 194 See generally Mayson, supra note 192, at 518–56 (arguing that there are no constitutional, 
practical, or moral justifications for the state to restrain a defendant’s liberty more than that of an equally 
dangerous nondefendant).  
 195 Barr Memorandum, supra note 184, at 1.  
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As Section IV.A suggested, a detention framework that centers around 
“dangerousness,” interpreted broadly to mean risk of rearrest, is likely to 
land unequally. Dangerousness analyses are likely to trigger stereotypes 
against Black men. And unwarranted racial disparities in policing will 
translate into increased risk of being rearrested, perpetuating racial 
disparities in detention. One way Congress could constrain the way judges 
evaluate dangerousness would be to amend the Bail Reform Act to restrict 
preventive detention to certain specified and narrow situations. For example, 
in its recent bail reform bill, the Illinois Pretrial Fairness Act, the Illinois 
legislature voted to abolish cash bail in the state.196 Unlike the federal Bail 
Reform Act, the Illinois bill does not authorize broad preventive detention. 
Instead, the bill allows a judge to detain defendants pending trial only if they 
pose a “specific, imminent threat of serious physical harm to an identifiable 
person or persons,” and are charged with certain offenses that include certain 
forcible felony offenses, stalking offenses, domestic abuse offenses, and 
firearms offenses, or if they have a “high likelihood of willful flight.”197  
Moreover, refocusing detention decisions on the risk of intentional 
flight—the original animating purpose of bail—could also reduce federal 
detention. Only 1% of federal defendants fail to make court appearances.198 
In the information age, it is difficult for a person to completely abscond, and 
interventions as simple as text-messaging reminders have proven effective 
in reducing failures to appear.199 
3. Expanding Appellate Review 
Congress might also consider amending the standard of appellate 
review of detention decisions as a way to cabin judicial discretion.200 For 
reputational and workload reasons, district and magistrate judges often seek 
to avoid reversal from appellate courts.201 Because district and magistrate 
 
 196 The Illinois Pretrial Fairness Act, H.B. 3653, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2021), was passed on 
January 13, 2021 and was signed by the Governor on February 22, 2021.  
 197 Id. §§ 110-4, 110-6.1 (listing offenses) 
 198 See COHEN, supra note 91, at 13.  
 199 See BRICE COOKE, BINTA ZAHRA DIOP, ALISSA FISHBANE, JONATHAN HAYES, AURELIE OUSS & 
ANUJ SHAH, USING BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE TO IMPROVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE OUTCOMES 4 (2018), 
https://www.ideas42.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Using-Behavioral-Science-to-Improve-Criminal-
Justice-Outcomes.pdf [https://perma.cc/CEG9-7KCA] (finding that reminder messages could reduce 
failure to appear by 26%). 
 200 See Joshua B. Fischman & Max M. Schanzenbach, Do Standards of Review Matter? The Case of 
Federal Criminal Sentencing, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 405, 406–07 (2011) (finding that changes in the 
standard of appellate review of federal sentencing decisions affects lower court judges). 
 201 In the sentencing context, for example, research has found that federal district judges were less 
likely to depart from the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines after Congress created de novo appellate review of 
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judges enjoy broad discretion in the pretrial context, a possible reform would 
be to impose stringent appellate review standards for detention decisions. It 
is possible that such stringency would cause district and magistrate judges to 
narrow the circumstances in which they will depart from the Bail Reform 
Act’s preference for release and order detention. 
A natural experiment suggests that such an approach is unlikely to 
reduce disparity. The federal circuit courts are split on the standard of review 
to apply when reviewing detention decisions, with some federal circuit 
courts giving more deference than others.202 To check if appellate review is 
successful at reducing racial disparities, Appendix Table A4 assesses 
whether disparities are reduced in those circuits with more stringent appellate 
review standards. Unfortunately, this is not the case. There appears to be no 
correlation between appellate review standards and levels of disparity. For 
example, as Table A4 demonstrates, Black–white disparity among men is 
 
such sentences. Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory 
Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1290 (2014). 
 202 The Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits give substantial deference to a district court’s findings by 
applying a “clearly erroneous” standard. See, e.g., United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir. 
2007) (“As a rule, we apply deferential review to a district court’s order of detention and will not reverse 
except for clear error . . . .”); United States v. Williams, 753 F.2d 329, 333 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying the 
“clearly erroneous” standard to reverse that the district court’s factual findings and subsequent decision); 
United States v. Manafort, 897 F.3d 340, 345–46 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting that although the standard of 
review remains an open question for the court, both parties agreed that the appropriate standard was clear 
error). The First, Third, and Seventh Circuits give the least deference by conducting an “independent 
review” of the decision and the record, giving only some deference to the district court’s determination. 
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 895 F.2d 810, 814 (1st Cir. 1990) (concluding that the court will adopt 
the review standard based on Congress’s intent for “the appellate courts to independently review all 
detention decisions, giving deference to the determination of the district court”); United States v. Delker, 
757 F.2d 1390, 1399 (3d Cir. 1985) (“An independent determination by the appellate court would seem 
appropriate . . . .”); United States v. Portes, 786 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1985) (“We join the majority of 
the circuits in adopting the so-called ‘independent review’ standard.”). The Fifth Circuit uses the 
traditional “abuse of discretion” standard. See, e.g., United States v. Fortna, 769 F.2d 243, 250 (5th Cir. 
1985) (explaining that as an appellate court, the “supported by the proceedings below” standard of review 
is appropriate). The Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits apply a slightly more stringent level of 
review than abuse of discretion by using the “clearly erroneous” standard to facts found by the district 
court, but a more independent review of mixed questions of law and fact. See, e.g., United States v. 
Hazime, 762 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying the “clearly erroneous” standard for factual findings 
and applying a more independent standard for “reviewing mixed questions of law and fact and the legal 
conclusions”); United States v. Maull, 773 F.2d 1479, 1487 (8th Cir. 1985) (“We believe that . . . the 
clearly erroneous standard should be applied to factual findings made by the district court . . . . However, 
conclusions and reasoning relating to the ultimate questions flowing from such factual considerations . . . 
should be the subject of independent review.”); United States v. Motamedi, 767 F.2d 1403, 1406 (9th Cir. 
1985) (holding that the applicable standard of review is “clearly erroneous” standard for factual findings 
“coupled with” an “independent examination of the facts, the findings, and the record”); United States v. 
Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1470–72 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining why the court adopts the “clearly 
erroneous” standard to factual findings and a more independent standard of review for mixed questions 
of law and fact). 
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highest in the First, Second, and Third Circuits. Hispanic–white disparity 
among men is highest in the First, Third, and Eighth Circuits. The First and 
Third Circuits—where disparity is the highest for Black and Hispanic men—
has the most stringent standard of review. Black–white disparity is lowest in 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, while Hispanic–white disparity 
is lowest in the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. The Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits—where disparity is lowest for Black and Hispanic Men—use a less 
stringent standard of review. 
There could be several reasons for the lack of correlation between 
disparity and standards of review. One is that there are very few circuit court 
appeals of detention orders.203 A possible solution might be to impose 
mandatory appeals of detention orders, but this would likely prove 
unworkable given the volume of detention decisions.204 Appeals courts 
would be overwhelmed if they had to deal quickly with a large volume of 
appeals and conduct an independent review of each detention decision, 
especially because the appeals would have to be handled immediately 
because the detention represents an ongoing harm. Moreover, as described 
above, much of the harm from detention happens within the first days or 
weeks of detention. Thus, an appeal is unlikely to serve as a substantial check 
on lower court judges’ discretion. This may be a reason why there are so few 
detention appeals in the first place.  
A second reason for the low number of appeals is that there is already 
one level of built-in review. Since most detention decisions are made by 
magistrate judges, a defendant can appeal the detention decisions to district 
judges. Defendants may believe that they are unlikely to succeed on appeal 
to a circuit court if they have already lost twice in the district court, especially 
because district court review of magistrate judge detention decisions are de 
novo in all circuits that have considered the question.205 Moreover, 
defendants who appeal their detention to a federal appellate court will have 
already been subject to detention for several weeks or months and suffered 
 
 203 In 2019, for example, a Westlaw search produced twenty-seven opinions (nine of which were 
published opinions) of the federal circuit courts that cite the Bail Reform Act. Due to the unique threat 
the COVID-19 pandemic poses to people held in carceral custody, litigation around federal pretrial 
detention has increased. In 2020 there were fifty-one opinions of federal circuit courts that cite the Bail 
Reform Act, eight of which were published opinions. 
 204 In 2018, for example, federal courts filed around 89,000 criminal cases per year. ADMIN. OFF. OF 
THE U.S. CTS., CRIMINAL STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY tbl.D (2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2018/12/31 
[https://perma.cc/DZ7S-GMFV]. 
 205 See supra note 114. 
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the concomitant harms. Thus, imposing further review does not appear to be 
a viable avenue for reducing racial disparities. 
4. Narrowing the Detention Presumptions 
Some have argued that Congress should amend the Bail Reform Act’s 
presumptions of detention under § 3142(e) because the presumptions are 
overbroad, operating in many cases where a defendant is unlikely to present 
danger to the community or a risk of flight.206 In particular, a presumption 
applies to any defendant charged with a drug offense for which the statutory 
maximum sentence is ten years or more—which encompasses “virtually all 
federal drug offenses.”207 In September 2020, Senators Chris Coons 
(Democrat of Delaware), Dick Durbin (Democrat of Illinois), and Mike Lee 
(Republican of Utah) introduced a bill that would eliminate the presumption 
of detention for drug offenders.208 Will amending or mitigating the 
presumption affect detention rates and disparity? The answers are “maybe” 
and “probably not.” Some have asserted that being subject to a detention 
presumption is an “almost de facto detention order,”209 but this 
characterization seems overblown. For male defendants in the data, around 
74% of presumption-defendants are detained pending trial, while around 
55% of nonpresumption-defendants are detained.  
Even if all of this difference could be attributed to the presumption 
(which would ignore all differences in offense characteristics and criminal 
records between the two groups), this would suggest that the presumption 
was responsible for a 19 percentage-point increase in the probability of 
detention. For female defendants, the presumption is associated with a larger 
increase in the detention rate, with 55% of female presumption-defendants 
in the data detained and 24% of female nonpresumption-defendants detained. 
But it is similarly likely that at least some (and perhaps nearly all) of this gap 
 
 206 Administration of Bail, supra note 89, at 3. 
 207 Id. at 16. Even more absurdly, the presumptions of detention are unmoored from dangerousness 
and flight risk. For example, a federal defendant charged with murder or sexual assault will not be subject 
to a presumption of detention under the Bail Reform Act, but a federal defendant charged with a low-
level, nonviolent drug offense could be. See also Shima Baradaran, Drugs and Violence, 88 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 227, 233 (2015) (arguing that “there is weak evidence to support the assumption drugs cause 
violence”).  
 208 S. 4549, 116th Cong. (2020). The same senators plan to introduce a bill with the same title this 
session. Press Release, Dick Durbin, U.S. Sen., Durbin, Lee, Coons to Introduce Bipartisan Smarter 
Pretrial Detention for Drug Charges Act (Feb. 11, 2021), https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/pres
s-releases/durbin-lee-coons-to-introduce-bipartisan-smarter-pretrial-detention-for-drug-charges-act 
[https://perma.cc/TSC9-YQZ3]. 
 209 Austin, supra note 11, at 61. 
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is explained by differences in the offense severity and criminal records of the 
defendants facing the presumption and those not.210 
While amending the presumptions contained in § 3142(e) is a deserving 
mission, the empirical evidence presented in Section IV.B.1 shows that it is 
unlikely that reforming—or even eliminating—the presumption of detention 
for drug offenses would do much to reduce racial disparity in pretrial 
detention. This is because when the regression analysis controls for whether 
the defendant is subject to the presumption, the estimates of race-based 
disparity barely change. If racial disparity in the application of the 
presumptions was generating racial disparity in detention, including this 
control would reduce the estimates of racial disparity, but this is not what 
Section IV.B.1 observes. Thus, addressing the presumptions of detention 
could plausibly lead to a reduction in federal detention overall, but it seems 
unlikely to meaningfully address detention disparity. 
B. Lessons for States 
As scholars, advocates, and policymakers have sought to reform pretrial 
detention in the states that currently rely on cash bail, a central debate has 
emerged. Many jurisdictions have recently begun to use actuarial tools to try 
to predict a defendant’s likelihood of complying with the terms of release, 
both in conjunction with or as a substitute for cash bail.211 For the remainder 
of this Article, I call such tools risk-assessment instruments. A risk-
assessment instrument uses data about an arrestee, such as their age, criminal 
record, employment status, charged conduct, and other factors that are 
thought to predict compliance with the terms of release, to generate a risk 
score that reflects the algorithm’s prediction about the probability that the 
arrestee will comply with the terms of release—typically these include 
appearing in court and not being rearrested during the period of pretrial 
release. Some risk-assessment instruments also use subjective factors, like 
the person’s “demeanor” (as reported by the employee entering the data) or 
personality and attitude questions. I am not aware of any risk-assessment 
instrument that uses race as an input.212 
 
 210 For example, in the data, female defendants who are coded as likely to be subject to a detention 
presumption have an average base offense level of 31.2 and an average of 2.7 criminal history points. In 
contrast, female defendants who are coded as not likely to be subject to a detention presumption have an 
average base offense level of 13.2 and 2.0 criminal history points.  
 211 Madeleine Carlisle, The Bail-Reform Tool that Activists Want Abolished, ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/09/the-bail-reform-tool-that-activists-want-
abolished/570913/ [https://perma.cc/L7DW-D8N8] (reporting that forty states use the PSA). 
 212 For a summary of the risk factors used in several risk-assessment instruments, see Mayson, supra 
note 192, at 512. 
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Risk assessment already plays an opaque, but likely small, role in 
federal detention decisions. Since 2010, the federal courts have employed a 
risk-assessment instrument called the Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument 
(PTRA).213 The PTRA was implemented with the expectation that its use 
would lead to increases in pretrial release for defendants receiving low or 
moderate risk scores.214 There is little publicly available information about 
how the PTRA is used by federal magistrate judges, and a search of federal 
district court dockets reveals scant evidence of judges using PTRA 
assessments in making detention decisions.215 Instead, to the extent that 
PTRA assessments influence detention decisions, it is likely via the 
recommendations of pretrial-services officers (PSOs),216 who prepare PTRA 
assessments and submit detention and release recommendations to the court. 
Although a 2018 report produced by the federal Probation and Pretrial 
Services Office stated that “75 percent of PTRAs are being completed before 
the judicial decision on pretrial release,”217 only five federal judicial districts 
include the PTRA score in the PSO’s report.218 Anecdotal evidence also 
suggests that PTRA results are often not communicated to the judge.219 The 
fact that detention rates have increased since the PTRA was implemented 
also suggests that it is not especially influential.220 Judges might disregard 
PTRA assessments because judges were not involved in the PTRA’s creation 
and because PTRA assessments are not directly connected to the Bail 
Reform Act.221 
 
 213 Thomas H. Cohen & Amaryllis Austin, Examining Federal Pretrial Release Trends over the Last 
Decade, 82 FED. PROB. 3, 5 (2018). 
 214 Id. at 10. 
 215 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, No. 20-10028-20-EFM, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56640, at *6 
(D. Kan. Mar. 30, 2020) (“The Court does not consider the PTRA score.”); United States v. Dokku, No. 
3:18-cr-341-S (1), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74847, at *14, *16–17 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2020) (declining to 
alter release conditions even though defendant was assessed at the lowest PTRA level). 
 216 See Cohen & Austin, supra note 213, at 6. 
 217 Thomas H. Cohen, Christopher T. Lowenkamp & William E. Hicks, Revalidating the Federal 
Pretrial Risk Assessment Instrument (PTRA): A Research Summary, 82 FED. PROB. 23, 29 (2018). 
 218 Cohen & Austin, supra note 213, at 9. 
 219 FED. JUD. CTR., OFF PAPER EPISODE 2, at 1, 16 (2017), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/off-
paper-episode-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/49N4-E7XH]. As federal defender Kathy Nester explained, “[T]he 
only person who really was even aware of the PTRA scores or the PTRA risk assessment results was the 
probation officer. And in our district, our probation officer wasn’t even conveying those risk analysis 
[sic] to the court. The court was not aware of the PTRA or what it meant.” Id. 
 220 Cohen & Austin, supra note 213, at 10 (finding that release rates decreased after the 
implementation of the PTRA even though it was deployed with the hope that it “might lead to an increase 
in release rates for defendants classified as either low . . . or moderate risk . . . by the PTRA”).  
 221 Brandon L. Garrett, Federal Criminal Risk Assessment, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 109–10 
(2019). 
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State legislators have turned to risk-assessment instruments to fill the 
void left when cash bail is eliminated. For example, in September 2018, 
California attempted to become the first state to fully eliminate the use of 
cash bail, and the state’s new law provides for the use of risk-assessment 
technologies in deciding pretrial release.222 The Public Safety Assessment 
(PSA), a risk-assessment tool developed by the Laura and John Arnold 
Foundation, is used in forty jurisdictions, including California.223 Then-
Senator Kamala Harris (Democrat of California) and Senator Rand Paul 
(Republican of Kentucky) introduced a bail reform bill in 2017 that both 
promoted the use in state courts of “individualized, pretrial assessments 
that . . . measure the risk of flight and risk of anticipated criminal conduct 
posed by a defendant while on pretrial release,” but also insisted that such 
tools “not result in unwarranted disparities on the basis of any classification 
protected under Federal nondiscrimination laws or the nondiscrimination 
laws of the applicable State.”224 
Critics argue, however, that these two goals are incompatible—that is, 
that a risk-assessment instrument that relies on inputs that are themselves the 
product of discrimination will necessarily generate discriminatory 
predictions. For example, consider the PSA. Although the PSA does not 
explicitly consider race as an input into its prediction algorithm, five of the 
nine factors the PSA uses to generate a prediction about a defendant’s post-
release behavior are based on the arrestee’s criminal history.225 To the extent 
that a person’s criminal history is a product of prior discrimination, an 
algorithmic tool that relies on criminal history to make predictions will likely 
generate biased results. 
 
 222 In 2018, the California legislature passed, and the Governor signed into law, Senate Bill 10, which 
eliminated cash bail. The law also established “Pretrial Assessment Services” that would “assess the risk 
level of persons charged with the commission of a crime, report the results of the risk determination to 
the court, and make recommendations for conditions of release of individuals pending adjudication of 
their criminal case.” S.B. 10, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4 (Cal. 2018) (amending CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 1320.7(g)). In November 2020, however, California voters rejected Proposition 25, which overturned 
the law. See McGreevy, supra note 32. 
 223 Carlisle, supra note 211. 
 224 Pretrial Integrity and Safety Act of 2017, S. 1593, 115th Cong. § 3032(c)(2)(A)(i)–(ii) (2017). 
 225 The PSA considers nine factors to generate a prediction about whether an arrestee is likely to fail 
to appear or be rearrested if released pending trial. The nine factors are as follows: age at current arrest; 
current violent offense; pending charge at the time of the offense; prior misdemeanor conviction; prior 
felony conviction; prior violent conviction; prior failure to appear in the past two years; prior failure to 
appear older than two years; and prior sentence of incarceration. LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., 
PUBLIC SAFETY ASSESSMENT: RISK FACTORS AND FORMULA 2, 
https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BL5M-NSDJ].   
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Critics have reversed their support of some bail-reform proposals in the 
face of this potential problem. In response to California’s efforts to replace 
cash bail with risk-assessment technology, more than 100 civil rights 
organizations including the American Civil Liberties Union and the NAACP 
reversed their earlier support of the bill and released a joint statement 
condemning the use of risk-assessment instruments in determining pretrial 
release.226 They premised their opposition on the grounds that “automated 
predictions based on [biased] data—although they may seem objective or 
neutral—threaten to further intensify unwarranted discrepancies in the 
justice system and to provide a misleading and undeserved imprimatur of 
impartiality for an institution that desperately needs fundamental change.”227 
In November 2020, California voters overturned California’s bail-reform 
law.228 
Critically, most of the debate around risk assessment in pretrial 
detention centers around the tools themselves. Proponents of risk assessment 
often argue that these tools either can or do reduce disparity.229 Others argue 
that risk-assessment instruments work best as a screening tool to identify 
defendants who pose little risk of violating the terms of release and thus can 
be released right away. Another potential benefit of risk assessment, 
motivated by behavioral economics, is that these algorithmic tools might 
give cover to judges who are risk-averse about releasing defendants. 
On the other hand, scholars have put forth serious legal and normative 
arguments against the use of risk-assessment instruments in legal decision-
making. The use of risk assessment in criminal cases raises important 
questions relating to equal protection, due process, and even intellectual-
property law.230 But perhaps the most intense criticism of risk-assessment 
 
 226 LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK ASSESSMENT” INSTRUMENTS: A 
SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS 1, 10 (2018), http://civilrightsdocs.info/pdf/criminal-
justice/Pretrial-Risk-Assessment-Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QW8-DUCJ]; see also White, supra note 32 
(reporting that “[t]he ACLU, NAACP and Human Rights Watch all abandoned their support” for 
California’s bail reform bill); ACLU of California Changes Position to Oppose Bail Reform Legislation, 
ACLU N. CAL. (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.aclunc.org/news/aclu-california-changes-position-oppose-
bail-reform-legislation [https://perma.cc/ZZN5-XWB6] (stating that “[a]fter further serious 
consideration, the ACLU of California has changed its position on the recently-amended SB 10 to 
oppose”). 
 227  LEADERSHIP CONF. EDUC. FUND, supra note 226, at 10.  
 228 See supra note 222. 
 229 See Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, 86 SOC. RSCH. 499, 499 (2019); Jon 
Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig & Sendhil Mullainathan, Human 
Decisions and Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. ECON. 237, 241 (2017). 
 230 See generally John Villasenor & Virginia Foggo, Artificial Intelligence, Due Process, and 
Criminal Sentencing, 2020 MICH. ST. L. REV. 295 (proposing changes to the way algorithms are used in 
the criminal justice system to ensure due process); Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: 
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instruments is that they are likely to perpetuate racial disparity because they 
rely on variables that themselves might be the product of discrimination or 
structural racism, as described above.231 
The nascent empirical evidence, however, finds that the use of risk-
assessment instruments does not have much effect on racial disparity.232 At 
first look, these findings are astonishing given the intense public debate 
around risk assessment. But the authors of these studies understand that risk 
assessment does not exist in a vacuum—it is used (or ignored) by human 
decision-makers. In other words, the growing empirical literature around risk 
assessment suggests that risk-assessment instruments should not only be 
analyzed on their own terms, but also relative to their plausible alternatives.  
For a jurisdiction seeking to eliminate cash bail, the most plausible 
alternative to a risk-assessment instrument is individual decision-making by 
judges. And even in jurisdictions that use risk assessment, the technology 
usually provides recommendations (not commands) to judges. Professors 
Megan Stevenson and Jennifer Doleac reach a similar conclusion, finding 
that risk assessment does not lead to reductions in incarceration in Virginia, 
despite evidence that judges rely on risk assessment in sentencing nonviolent 
offenders.233 The reason, Professors Stevenson and Doleac explain, lies in 
 
Intellectual Property in the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (examining, in part, 
the implications of trade secret law on risk assessment tools used at sentencing); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-
Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014) 
(arguing that algorithmic tools violate equal protection principles by allowing for discriminatory criteria 
to be used in purportedly scientific forms); see also generally Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic 
Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019) (arguing that equal protection doctrine is ill-equipped to 
address racial inequity in algorithmic tools used in criminal justice decision-making).  
 231 Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 
23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing 
[https://perma.cc/UD2S-SRDQ] (analyzing risk predictions from COMPAS and arguing that the 
algorithm is biased against Black defendants); Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The 
Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 237 (2015); Stephanie Lacambra, Jeremy Gillula 
& Jamie Williams, Recidivism Risk Assessments Won’t Fix the Criminal Justice System, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/12/recidivism-risk-assessments-wont-fix-
criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/W974-AH9E]. But see Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, 
Avi Feller & Sharad Goel, A Computer Program Used for Bail and Sentencing Decisions Was Labeled 
Biased Against Blacks. It’s Actually Not That Clear., WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2016, 4:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/17/can-an-algorithm-be-racist-our-
analysis-is-more-cautious-than-propublicas/ [https://perma.cc/QST5-7GGE] (discussing that COMPAS 
may be biased depending on the standard of fairness applied).  
 232 Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands of Humans 
1, 2 (IZA Inst. Lab. Econ., Discussion Paper No. 12853, 2019). 
 233 See id. (finding that adoption of risk assessment in sentencing for nonviolent felony offenders and 
sex offenders had little effect on racial disparity in sentencing); Stevenson, supra note 34, at 309 (racial 
disparities remained constant within counties after Kentucky adopted risk assessment for pretrial release); 
CarlyWill Sloan, George Naufal & Heather Caspers, The Effect of Risk Assessment Scores on Judicial 
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how judges exercise discretion, particularly in sentencing young offenders. 
In Virginia, the risk-assessment algorithm frequently predicted young 
offenders to be at high risk of reoffending.234 But the algorithm did not 
understand that judges traditionally show leniency toward young offenders. 
Because judges have discretion to not follow the risk-assessment tool, 
Professors Stevenson and Doleac explain, they simply deviated in sentencing 
many young offenders.235 
Any effort to reform bail should understand the promise and pitfalls of 
vesting the detention decision with human actors, as this Article shows. As 
a result, states should explicitly seek to address racial disparity. As a state 
that has recently eliminated cash bail, New Jersey’s experience with bail 
reform is instructive. Until 2014, New Jersey used a pretrial release system 
that operated, in large part, by requiring arrestees to post money bail to secure 
release.236 The New Jersey constitution did not allow judges to detain a 
defendant based on danger to the community.237 New Jersey’s cash-bail 
system—like all cash-bail systems—perpetuated poverty and inequality and 
imposed substantial unwarranted costs on individuals and the public. In 
response, in 2014, New Jersey amended its constitution and state law to 
create a pretrial detention system that broadly resembles the federal 
system.238 New Jersey now determines pretrial release based on an 
individualized evaluation of whether a defendant is a flight risk or presents 
a danger of committing a crime while on release. The goal of the reform was 
to “promote defendants’ liberty interests by significantly reducing the 
number of defendants held in jail before trial.”239 New Jersey also now uses 
 
Behavior and Defendant Outcomes 1, 12 (IZA Inst. Lab. Econ., Discussion Paper No. 11948, 2018) 
(finding that the adoption of risk-assessment technology in a Texas county did not increase racial disparity 
in pretrial detention). 
 234 Stevenson & Doleac, supra note 232, at 3. 
 235 Id. at 4. 
 236 N.J. CTS., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18–19 (2014), 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/finalreport3202014.pdf?c=3qG [https://perma.cc/4KF6-
LDRP].  
 237 In 2014, New Jersey amended its constitution to permit preventive detention with New Jersey 
Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 128, § 1, which was approved at the general election on November 4, 
2014. Before this amendment, the relevant constitutional provision did not allow preventive detention. S. 
CON. RES. 128, 216th Leg. (N.J. 2017).  
 238 N.J. CONST. art. I, § 11 (“All persons shall, before conviction, be eligible for pretrial release. 
Pretrial release may be denied to a person if the court finds that no amount of monetary bail, non-monetary 
conditions of pretrial release, or combination of monetary bail and non-monetary conditions would 
reasonably assure the person’s appearance in court when required, or protect the safety of any other person 
or the community, or prevent the person from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice 
process.”). 
 239 N.J. CTS., supra note 236, at 3. 
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the PSA to provide judges with a prediction about whether an arrestee 
presents a low or high risk of noncompliance with the terms of release.240 
The early results of New Jersey’s bail reform found that the jail 
population decreased as a result of the reforms—fewer people are now 
detained pending trial than in the years before the reform. The effects of the 
reforms on racial disparity are more complicated, but mirror the findings 
contained in this Article. Black–white disparity among female arrestees fell 
after the law was implemented—Black women made up 44% of women held 
in detention before the legal change and 34% of women held in detention 
after, while white women became more represented in the jail population, 
increasing from 44% to 54% of women in the jail population after bail 
reform. Black–white disparity among men, however, did not budge. Black 
men made up 52% of male arrestees held in detention both before and after 
bail reform in New Jersey, leading the state’s Administrative Office of the 
Courts to conclude that “[t]he overrepresentation of [B]lack males in the 
pretrial jail population remains an area in need of further examination by 
New Jersey’s criminal justice system as a whole.”241 
New Jersey’s experience with bail reform exemplifies the importance 
of directly focusing on reducing racial disparity in pretrial detention. As this 
Article demonstrates, racial disparities among men are likely to persist even 
if lawmakers eliminate cash bail. This Article also makes clear that 
policymakers must consider the unique challenges that are faced by Black 
and Hispanic men. I do not mean to suggest that Black women are not 
uniquely harmed by the criminal system, overrepresented relative to white 
women, and subject to disproportionate and unequal policing. But the 
intersectional results in this Article suggest that when it comes to pretrial 
detention, Black and Hispanic men are subject to a unique and cumulative 
disadvantage that typically characterizes intersectional critiques of single-
axis conceptions of disparity. Those seeking to address this disadvantage 
must confront it head on. 
 
 
 240 CHLOE ANDERSON, CINDY REDCROSS, ERIN VALENTINE & LUKE MIRATRIX, MDRC CTR. FOR 
CRIM. JUST. RSCH., EVALUATION OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORMS THAT USE THE PUBLIC 
SAFETY ASSESSMENT: EFFECTS OF NEW JERSEY’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 2 (2019), 
https://www.mdrc.org/sites/default/files/PSA_New_Jersey_Report_%231.pdf [https://perma.cc/374A-
DUHM]. 
 241 GLENN A. GRANT, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE N.J. CTS., Jan. 1–Dec. 31 2018 REPORT TO THE 
GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 7 (2019), https://njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/2018cjrannual.
pdf [https://perma.cc/GDL9-JFE4]. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA CONSTRUCTION 
Matching Defendants 
 The data are matched between the Commission and LIONS datasets 
using an iterative matching process described here. The purpose of the 
matching process is to merge the two datasets into one cohesive dataset. The 
matching variables used for the process are as follows: 
 
Federal judicial district Length of probation imposed 
Sentencing year Gender 
Sentencing month Offense type 
Sentencing day, where available242 Substance type, where available 
Months of incarceration imposed Lead charge title in the U.S. Code 
Days of incarceration imposed 
Length of supervised release 
imposed 
Lead charge section in the  
U.S. Code 
 
I designed the matching process to balance two competing challenges 
in selecting variables on which to match. First, with too few matching 
variables, the matching process is likely to generate excess many-to-many 
matches. In other words, as the number of matching variables decreases, it is 
increasingly difficult to uniquely identify matches. Second, with too many 
matching variables, however, the matching process is likely to miss matches 
because the LIONS data has many missing values and is potentially 
susceptible to human error. In other words, as the number of matching 
variables increases, it is increasingly difficult to identify slightly imperfect 
matches. 
The iterative process begins by trying to find perfect matches: 
defendants in the two data sources who uniquely match on every matching 
variable. After noting these matches and removing them from each data 
source, the process gradually relaxes the number of variables upon which the 
defendants must match, in order to find as many matches as possible. 
 
Representativeness of the Matched Sample 
Table A1 compares variable means for defendants in the matched 
sample to defendants in the full Commission data. Overall, the matching 




 242 This variable is only available for defendants sentenced in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. 
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The Presumption of Detention 
The presumption of detention variable is coded as 1 in the following 
cases: (a) convictions in cases involving drugs for which the statutory 
maximum is at least 120 months; (b) convictions under 8 U.S.C. § 924(c); 
(c) convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 956; (d) convictions under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2332(b); (e) convictions under U.S.C. Title 77; and (f) convictions for sex 
offenses. 
APPENDIX B: ADDITIONAL TABLES 
This Appendix presents additional robustness checks of the results. 
Table A1 compares variable means for defendants in the matched sample to 
defendants in the full Commission data to assess representativeness of the 
sample. Table A2 presents the results by parenthood status, which are used 
to generate Figure 5 in the Article. Table A3 presents results that control for 
narrow offense categories, the average income in the defendant’s home zip 
code in 2013 (logged), and fixed effects for the defendant’s home zip code. 
As described in Section II.B, the home zip code variable is taken from the 
LIONS data and contains many missing values. Moreover, I remove zip 
codes from the sample if they include fewer than twenty defendants. As a 
result, the sample used with zip code controls is much smaller than the data 
sample used in the Article. The results are largely robust to all of these 
controls with the exception of Hispanic–white disparity among female 
defendants, which is not statistically significant in any of the specifications. 
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Male 0.84 0.83 0.83 
Black 0.40 0.39 0.40 
Hispanic 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Other Race/Ethnicity 0.05 0.05 0.05 
White 0.45 0.44 0.44 
Age (years) 36.9 36.9 36.8 
Less than High School 0.29 0.30 0.30 
HS Only 0.40 0.39 0.39 
Some College 0.23 0.23 0.23 
College Graduate 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Fines Waived 0.92 0.92 0.91 
Criminal History Category (1–6) 2.65 2.62 2.64 
    
Case Characteristics 
Drugs Involved 0.42 0.41 0.42 
Base Offense Level (0–47) 19.3 19.1 19.2 
Weapon 0.132 0.13 0.14 
Year Case Began (median) 2007 2007 - 
Fiscal Year Sentenced (median) 2009 2009 2009 
    
Pretrial Detention Variables 
Detention 0.60 0.59 0.59 
Released on Conditions 0.30 0.31 0.31 
Released on Recognizance 0.10 0.10 0.10 
    
Observations 337,916 396,061 521,023 
Note. All variables are indicator variables (0/1) except where units are noted.  
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TABLE A2: PARENTHOOD AND PRETRIAL DETENTION 
 
  Is a Parent? (0/1) Parents Nonparents 
 Female Male Female Male Female Male 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Black 0.065*** 0.134*** -0.028*** 0.040*** -0.019** 0.047***  
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
Hispanic 0.103*** 0.120*** 0.011 0.054*** 0.039*** 0.057  
(0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.012) (0.008) 
Other Race  0.071*** 0.063*** 0.005 -0.003 -0.020 -0.010  
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.009)        
Mean 0.593 0.591 0.322 0.645 0.351 0.643 
Observations 54,282 278,408 31,541 164,184 21,302 113,520 
Note. OLS regressions of whether a defendant was detained pretrial. ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: 
p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered at the courthouse level and reported in parentheses. All 
regressions include controls listed in Table 2, column 6. 
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TABLE A3: ROBUSTNESS 





Narrow Offense and 
Zip Code Income 
Zip Code Fixed 
Effects 
Race and Gender      
Male 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 0.100***  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Black 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.011***  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Hispanic 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.028***  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Other Race/Ethnicity -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.015*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
      
Race–Gender      
Black and Female -0.032*** -0.029*** -0.027*** -0.025*** -0.043***  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) 
Hispanic and Female 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004 -0.024*  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) 
Other Race and Female -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 -0.004 -0.013  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) 
Black and Male 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.088***  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Hispanic and Male 0.116*** 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.104***  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Other Race and Male 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.047***  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
White and Male 0.060*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
      
Observations 334,987 334,908 165,945 166,328 104,490 
Note. OLS regressions of whether a defendant was detained pretrial on demographic and case characteristics and fixed effects as 
indicated. ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered at the courthouse level and reported in parentheses. In 
addition to controls indicated in the Table, all regressions include controls listed in Table 2, column 6. 







TABLE A4: DISPARITY BY CIRCUIT: MALE DEFENDANTS 
 
Independent Review Abuse of 
Discretion 
Clear Error (Facts) + Independent Review (Law) Clear Error 
  1st 3d 7th 5th 6th 8th 9th 11th 2d 4th 
Black 0.082*** 0.072*** 0.033*** 0.009 0.030*** 0.045*** 0.030*** 0.025 0.083*** 0.052***  
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.006) 
Hispanic 0.100*** 0.102*** 0.058*** 0.021* 0.082*** 0.099*** 0.026*** 0.031* 0.062*** 0.092***  
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) 
Other Race 0.053 -0.021 0.018 -0.047** 0.045* 0.038** -0.030*** -0.023 -0.005 -0.005  
(0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022) (0.014) (0.009) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) 
 
          
Mean 0.682 0.573 0.634 0.693 0.620 0.695 0.649 0.638 0.548 0.688 
Observations 7,077 19,375 21,065 22,905 38,818 27,855 31,287 34,578 23,419 33,584 
Note. OLS regressions of whether the defendant was detained pretrial. ***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.10. Standard errors are clustered at 
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